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I.

INTRODUCTION

For most of our nation's history, many Americans with disabilities
have dwelt in the shadows, having little presence in public life or the
business world. Historically, individuals with disabilities2 have been
isolated, segregated, and otherwise discriminated against in the areas of
employment, housing, education, communications, recreation, health
services, access to public services, and even in the pursuit of guaranteed
constitutional rights, such as the right to vote.3 Traditional American
disability policy has focused on society's obligation to provide financial
subsistence to those whose disabilities prevent them from working and
achieving economic self-sufficiency. Accordingly, disability benefits
programs operate in the federal, state, and private sector arenas and
provide a basic level of financial, and sometimes health,6 security to
individuals who are disabled and deemed unable to work.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990C ("ADA") forged a
new and long overdue way of thinking about people with disabilities.8
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society.
Id.
2. According to Congressional findings, "some 43,000,000 million Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing." Id. § 12101(a)(1).
3. See id. § 12101(a)(2)-(3).
4. See EDWARD D. BERKowrrz, DISABLED POLICY 41-43 (1987) (describing how disability
policy and assistance programs began as linked with the American public welfare system and as
charitable financial support for the retirement of individuals with disabilities).
5. Disability benefits programs exist on the federal, state, and private sector level. The primary programs under these categories are, respectively, Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 420-425, and Supplemental Security Income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d,
both administered by the Social Security Administration, state workers' compensation laws, and
private disability insurance plans. Over seven million individuals in the United States receive disability benefits through one or more of these programs. See William S.Cohen, Cleaning Up Social
Security, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1995, at 19.
6. Recipients of federal disability benefits are also eligible for basic medical health coverage. Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits recipients who have been entitled to 24 coisecutive months of benefits are eligible for Medicare under 42 U.S.C. § 1395c, and Supplemental
Security Income recipients may be eligible for Medicaid under § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)().
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
8. For a discussion of the political struggles leading to the ADA, see generally JOSEPH P.
SHAPIRO, No Prr: PEOPLE WITH DiSAEMLrms FORGING A Nav CVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993);
Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities,43 EMORY L.J. 245 (1994) (reviewing SHAPIRO, supra); see also HOUSE COMM. ON
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The ADA recognized that disabled individuals often want to work and
can work with some accommodation, but do not do so (because they are
not hired, must quit, or are terminated), in significant part, because of
employer prejudice or other discrimination in the workplace.9 In contrast to traditional disability policy, which emphasizes maintaining the
disabled, the ADA provides disabled individuals with substantive civil
rights that prohibit discrimination on the basis of their disability and require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified
applicants and employees with disabilities, thereby enabling them to
perform essential job functions.
In enacting the ADA, Congress made clear that "the Nation's
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals."'" The ADA was passed in part because of a concern that those "who have experienced discrimination on
the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination."" Also underlying the passage of the ADA was the expectation that a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability
would provide the means for disabled individuals to become economically self-sufficient by working and ultimately reducing their 2 dependence upon private and government-supported benefit programs.
An important and recurring question arising in disability discrimination cases across the country presents an apparent conflict for individuals who have applied for or received disability benefits and who
also seek to assert rights under the ADA. The issue addresses whether
an individual who is, or claims to be totally disabled and unable to work
due to disability under the benefits eligibility standards, can still be
qualified to perform the essential functions of a particular job, with or
without reasonable accommodation (a necessary element for proving
EDUC. AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACr (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter ADA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
9. See ADA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 107, 305; see also LouIs HARRIS &
ASSOCS., INC., TEE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS
INTO THE MAINSTREAM 70-71 (1986) [hereinafter ICD SuRvEY] (finding that, more than fear of
losing disability benefits, many disabled do not work because of employer attitudes, lack of education, skill, adaptive equipment or transportation, and need for continued medical treatment).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
11. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
12. See id. § 12101(a)(9) ("Mhe continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice... costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."); ADA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 316
(referencing testimony and reports concluding that "discrimination results in dependency on social
welfare programs that cost the taxpayers unnecessary billions of dollars each year").
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unlawful discrimination under the ADA).
The following scenarios depict variations of the problem: First,
Beverly, a successful sales representative, develops a degenerative spinal disease which limits her ability to walk on her own. She could, however, perform essential functions of her job, such as making sales calls,
with the assistance of a motorized cart. Her employer allegedly thinks
that the cart "will not look right" and fails to provide the requested accommodation. The employee stops working and receives total disability
benefits. Second, Leonard, fully able to perform his job, is terminated
shortly after he revealed to his employer that he is IV-positive. Leonard thereafter applies for and receives total disability benefits. His HIVpositive status is presumed to be totally disabling under the applicable
disability benefits regulations.' 4 Third, Anthony, due to his disability,
has not worked since 1968 and receives total disability benefits under
Social Security. In applying for a job, Anthony requests a temporary
"job coach" as a reasonable accommodation. The employer refuses to
interview him based, allegedly, upon his disability.' 5 Finally, Charles
does not return to work after a surgical injury and seeks disability
benefits claiming total inability to work. After his request for benefits is
denied, Charles seeks reinstatement to his former position and is refused. 16 Each of these individuals contend that he or she was the victim
of discrimination because of his or her disability. But in subsequent disability discrimination lawsuits, the respective employers used the fact
that these individuals sought or received disability benefits, upon representations of inability to work, as an attempt to bar such claims.
From one perspective, the question involves the dubious situation
in which individuals appear to be "speak[ing] out of both sides of [their]
mouth[s]"' 7 in asserting seemingly inconsistent positions-in effect, that
they are both too disabled to work when seeking benefits, yet also otherwise qualified to perform a particular job in an ADA forum. From
another vantage, the question involves a situation in which disabled individuals might be forced into the "untenable position of choosing between [the] right to seek [relatively immediate] disability benefits and
13. See Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, Inc., 116 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
14. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
958 (1997).
15. See Marvello v. Chemical Bank, 923 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
16. See Bonnano v. Gannett Co., 934 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
17. Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994). For a discussion of these types of cases, see Dana S. Connell, The Plaintiff'sTwo-Sided Mouth: Defeating
ADA Claims Based on Inconsistent Positions Taken by the Plaintiff on Other Claims, 22 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 5 (1996).
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[the] right to seek redress for an alleged violation of the ADA." '
Courts increasingly face this issue whenever a plaintiff in a dis-

ability discrimination action has sought, received, or is receiving disability benefits. Many courts addressing this issue have analyzed the
question, expressly or implicitly, through the common law equitable
doctrine of judicial estoppel-the principle that "prevents a party from
asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position
previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding."' 9 Accordingly, should an individual who has applied for or received disabilityrelated benefits be judicially estopped or otherwise precluded from asserting that he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions
of a job for the purposes of asserting a claim under the ADA for disability-related discrimination?"

An obvious split (or splintering) has formed among the circuit and
district courts that have addressed this issue. In the federal arena, cases
from the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals reflect the most ar2
dent use of judicial estoppel. ' On the other end, the Seventh,2 D.C., 21

18. Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D. 111.
1994).
19. Ergo Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1996). For an argument against
the use of judicial estoppel, see Douglas W. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Shields into
Swords and Back Again, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1711 (1991).
20. Other circuits not recognizing the use of judicial estoppel have achieved largely the
same result by holding that an individual making representations of total disability in connection
with benefits proceedings cannot be "otherwise qualified" for purposes of stating a prima facie
claim under the ADA. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
21. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1996)
(applying judicial estoppel to preclude a disabled individual from asserting legal claims based on
her ability to work after she had received a workers' compensation settlement for temporary total
disability benefits); McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 619 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 958 (1997) (invoking judicial estoppel and ruling that an HIV-positive employee who
applied for disability benefits after his alleged unlawful termination was "'speak[ing] out of both
sides of [his] mouth"' in claiming he was qualified to bring a discrimination claim under the ADA
(quoting Reigel, 859 F. Supp. at 970)). But see Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494,
502 (3d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging "considerable criticism" of the McNemar decision).
22. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
SSA determinations concerning disability are based on different standards and therefore not dispositive as to whether a disabilities recipient may sue under the ADA); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d
1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a determination of disability by the SSA for benefits purposes does not preclude a former employee from asserting a claim for unlawful employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,794 (1988)).
23. See Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of the employer and holding that the employee's receipt of disability benefits did not preclude him from asserting an ADA claim); Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, Inc., 116 F.3d 588, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment for
the employer even though the employee had received long-term disability benefits after the employer allegedly denied requests for reasonable accommodations).
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and, more recently, the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have refused to apply judicial estoppel or preclude ADA claims on the basis of
representations made by plaintiffs on disability benefits applications.
The First,2 Fifthf Sixth,27 and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
addressed the issue differently.29 Numerous district court cases have di-

24. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997).
25. See August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 584 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that an
individual who claimed total disability for the purpose of receiving benefits was precluded from
later asserting that he was a "qualified handicapped person" under Massachusetts law). But see
D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for
employer and distinguishing August because plaintiff never claimed to be totally disabled until
after requests for accommodation were made).
26. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997)
("[Tihe application for or the receipt of social security disability benefits creates a rebuttablepresumption that the claimant or recipient of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting that
he is a 'qualified individual with a disability."'). But see Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., 948 F. Supp.
27, 29 (W.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1997) ("It is impossible for [plaintiff] to
have been both totally disabled under social security law and able to perform the essential functions of his position under the ADA.").
27. See Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming
summary judgment for employer where employee previously asserted that he was unable to perform his former position, but holding that an unsuccessful position of total disability does not estop a subsequent assertion that plaintiff could perform another job); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Ky. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-6361, 1998 WL 29870, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan.
29, 1998) (reversing summary judgment entered on judicial estoppel grounds and following the
approaches of Swanks and Weiler).
28. See Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting the estoppel issue "remains open in our Circuit"); Budd v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 103 F.3d 699, 700 (8th
Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (affirming the application of estoppel to preclude an ADA claimant from
proving he could perform the job due to contrary representations in a disability benefits applications); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a person claiming total disability is not "'otherwise qualified"' to perform a job within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1982)). But see Robinson v.
Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Social Security determinations ... are
not synonymous with a determination of whether a plaintiff is a 'qualified person' for purposes of
the ADA."). The Eighth Circuit declined to reconcile Budd, Beauford, and Robinson and "[left] for
another day the question of whether and to what extent judicial estoppel, or some other form of
estoppel, will operate to prohibit someone who has formerly claimed to be 'totally disabled' from
making out a prima facie ADA case." Dush, 124 F.3d at 962 n.8.
29. The Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have not directly addressed the question, but
have respectively affirmed cases applying judicial estoppel. See Violette v. International Bus.
Machs. Corp., 962 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D. Vt. 1996) ("A finding of... a disability [for social security purposes] estops a plaintiff from claiming he is a 'qualified individual."'), affd, 116 F.3d
466 (2d Cir. 1997); Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 221-22 (D.S.C. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff's representation of total disability to obtain benefits estopped her from asserting that she is a "qualified individual" in her ADA suit), aft'd, No. 96-2784, 1997 WL 786272
(4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997); Ricks v. Xerox Corp., 877 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 n.9 (D. Kan. 1995)
(noting that a plaintiff's misrepresentation of his condition in pursuit of disability benefits is likely
to result in his being estopped from claiming he is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1453 (10th
Cir. 1996).
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vided on the issue in a similar fashion.' Adding to the mix, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commissionr 3 ' ("EEOC") has issued enforce-

ment guidelines applicable to its investigators in all jurisdictions taking
the position that the judicial estoppel cases were wrongly decided.3 ' The

EEOC, as well as the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), maintain
that representations made in connection with an application for disability benefits should not be an automatic bar to an ADA claim.3 Despite
this splintering of authority, the United States Supreme Court has declined, without comment, to review contested application of the judicial
estoppel doctrine to disability discrimination claims.N
The judicial estoppel defense, or argument that an individual who

has made a claim of "total disability" in connection with various benefit
applications is precluded from claiming to be qualified in an ADA ac-

tion, is consistently invoked in ADA litigation. A number of district
courts agree, holding that prior representations of total disability preclude a plaintiff from asserting that he is qualified to perform the essen-

tial functions of the position in question.35 Most of these rulings against
30. See cases cited infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
31. The EEOC is responsible for enforcement of the employment discrimination provisions
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994); 29 U.S.C.
§ 791, 794c (1994). The ADA incorporates the powers, remedies, and procedures of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). As an administrative prerequisite to filing an ADA
lawsuit, individuals must comply with the EEOC's complaint resolution process. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1994).
32. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of RepresentationsMade in Applications
for Benefits on the Determinationof Whether a Person Is a "QualifiedIndividual with a Disability" Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, in AVOIDING WORKPLACE LIGATmON, at 141
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-562, 1997) [hereinafter EEOC
Guidance].
33. See id. at 174-79; see also Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d
582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing the SSA's opposition to the use of judicial estoppel). The
juxtaposition of the EEOC guidelines and contrary case law precedent in some jurisdictions raises
the complicated issue of whether the EEOC can tell its agencies to disregard case law precedent in
the respective jurisdictions or whether the courts must give deference to the EEOC pronouncements. See Wayne N. Outten & Jack A. Raisner, EEOC Resolves 'Untenable Choice'forDisabled
Employees, or Does It?, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 21, 1997, at 9 (asserting that the EEOC's Enforcement
Guidance on Disability Representationsis likely to receive deference because the ADA gives the
EEOC rule and regulation-making authority and because the guidelines are so "thorough and persuasive"). But see Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819, 823-24 n.Il (5th Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that little deference need be given to EEOC administrative regulations when the language of the
statute is clear).
34. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 958 (1997). At the time the Supreme Court denied certiorari in McNemar, similar cases were
pending in the D.C. and Fifth Circuits. See cases cited supra notes 23, 26. The Supreme Court will
likely be asked again to resolve the conflict among the circuit courts after additional circuit rulings
are handed down.
35. See cases cited infra note 152.
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plaintiffs on the basis of judicial estoppel are made at the summary
judgment stage. Consequently, the merits of the underlying ADA claims
are usually never reached. In some cases which have gone to trial, however, fact finders have found in favor of the plaintiff on ADA claims,
even when evidence of prior representations regarding disability was
presented."
This Article examines the competing substantive arguments at isin
sue the divided court rulings viewed against federal disability policies
and explores how the apparent conflict can be resolved. Part II examines
the two general avenues of support available to individuals who do not
work or who have lost their jobs because of their disability---disabilityrelated benefits and anti-discrimination laws-setting forth the substantive provisions and policy objectives of the disability benefits programs
and the ADA. Part III discusses recent court decisions reflecting the
split among the federal courts regarding an individual's standing to
bring an ADA claim after having sought total disability benefits. Part IV
analyzes the alleged conflict between the ADA and social security disability benefits programs in light of three primary considerations: (i) the
propriety of the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, (ii) the
statutory language of each Act, and (iii) the policy goals of each Act.
This Article concludes that courts declining to apply judicial estoppel
got it right: prior representations of total disability made in the disability
benefits context should not pose an automatic bar to preclude a statutory
claim of disability employment discrimination. 7
Applying judicial estoppel or other implicit preclusion principles in
this context disregards the fundamental, as well as definitional, differences between the ADA and other statutory and contractual disability
benefits programs and threatens to undermine the overriding statutory
purposes of encouraging the disabled to seek employment and eradicat-

36. See, e.g., Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1448 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (exercising discretion by not applying judicial estoppel, in part, because the jury concluded
that plaintiff would be able to perform the essential functions of her position under the ADA despite representations made in support of her disability benefits applications); Harris v. Marathon
Oil Co., 948 F. Supp. 27, 28-29 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (reversing a jury verdict for an ADA plaintiff on
judicial estoppel grounds), aff'd, 108 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1997); cf Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler,
678 N.E.2d 853, 858, 860 (Mass. 1997) (holding estoppel inappropriate in affirming a jury verdict
in plaintiff's favor because a genuine fact issue existed as to whether plaintiff was able to perform
the essential functions of his job under Massachusetts employment discrimination law, with reasonable accommodations, despite having received disability benefits).

37. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997); Swanks v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101
F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1996); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ing disability discrimination." In barring these claims, particularly at the
summary judgment stage when the issue is primarily raised, the merits
of the underlying claim are never reached, and the potentially unlawful

discrimination is never exposed. Moreover, the perceived problems of
"'chameleonic litigants,"' 39 can be remedied by other less drastic
means. 40
Despite a plaintiff's prior representation of "total disability," courts
in each case should make an individualized assessment of the facts and

circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's application for benefits, examine the procedural and definitional standards used in the benefits de-

termination, and consider other evidence which indicates a plaintiff
may, with or without reasonable accommodation, have been qualified
for the particular job.41 Where there is at least conflicting evidence that a
plaintiff may be qualified based upon this individualized inquiry, a
plaintiff should be permitted to present his case to the fact finder for ultimate resolution. Denying plaintiffs their statutory rights to bring an

action for disability discrimination by virtue of having pursued rights to
seek disability benefits ignores significant differences in the applicable
legal standards set by the ADA and benefits programs, and thus thwarts
the fundamental objectives of these laws and programs.
II. AVENUES OF HELP TO THE DISABLED: BENEFITS AND LAWS
PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AND REQUIRING
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

The financial impact of having a disability or becoming disabled 4'
can be devastating. 43 Individuals with disabilities face staggering levels
38. See Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277,284 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
39. Wilson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 95 C 50336, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9559, *1
(N.D. Ill. June 13, 1997).
40. See infra Part IV.D.
41. See generally EEOC Guidance, supra note 32, at 166-67, 74, 178.

42. The problem should be a concern for everyone, not just disabled individuals, for we all
face the possibility that we might one day become disabled through an accident or illness. See
SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 7. "[D]isability ... is the one minority that anyone can join at any time,
as a result of a sudden automobile accident, a fall down a flight of stairs, cancer, or disease. Fewer
than 15 percent of disabled Americans were born with their disabilities:' Id.; see also SOCIAL SEC.
ADMIN., PuB. No. 05-10029, DisABIurry 3 (1995) (noting studies which show that one in four
young workers will become temporarily or permanently disabled at some point in their lifetime).
43. For example, the following table demonstrates the loss of income from a stated age until
65 as a result of becoming disabled:
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of unemployment and poverty 4 In fact, "[n]ot working is perhaps the
truest definition of [what] it means to be disabled."'45 Attaining financial
security is a pervasive challenge for individuals with disabilities, some
of whom are too disabled to earn an income. Other disabled individuals
have the ability and desire to work, 4 but either cannot find a job or
constantly face the possibility of losing their current job because of dis-

ability discrimination. 47 As a result, a "majority of those individuals
with disabilities not working and out of the labor force must depend on
insurance payments or government benefits for support."4'

Age 35
Age 40

$75,000
$2,250,000
$1,875,000

$100,000
3,000,000
2,500,000

$150,000
4,500,000
3,750,000

Age 45
Age 50
Age 55

$1,500,000
$1,125,000
$ 750,000

2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000

3,000,000
2,250,000
1,500,000

ANNUAL SALARY

1

Frank J. Rief, InI, DisabilityInsurance:If You Have Not ConsideredIt, You Are Better Off Dead!,
C472 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1151, 1154 (Mar. 1, 1990).
44. A 1996 General Accounting Office Study found that 22% of all disabled people between
the ages of 16 and 64 live at or below the poverty line, and an additional 12% maintain incomes
no greater than 150% of the poverty line. The study also found that 15% of the working-age disabled population receive public assistance, whereas only 2% of the working-age nondisabled
population receive such assistance. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEOPLE WITH DIsABILITIES: FEDERAL PROGRAMS COULD WORK TOGETHER MORE EFFICIENTLY TO PROMOTE
EMPLOYIENT 10 (1996).
45. ICD SURVEY, supranote 9, at 47.
46. This really is a key assumption underlying the ADA-that having a disability does not
necessarily render a person unable to work, particularly when reasonable accommodations are
made. This policy assumption arguably runs counter to the concept in the social security context
where being "disabled" means unable to work. See Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers
to Bringing Suit Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 913 (1997)
(stating that these disability laws and programs "stem from different philosophical views of disability"); see also ADA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 307 ("Sixty-six percent of working-age disabled persons, who are not working, say that they would like to have a job."); ICD
SURVEY, supra note 9, at 52 (reporting that 62% of working age disabled persons are not employed and of that percent, 66% want to work). The 1CD Survey observes:
It is in the area of work, even more than social life and activities, that disability excludes people most from mainstream American life. For most Americans, striving to
reach one's abilities amounts to working to achieve career and financial goals. Our society expects people to work, and the preeminent criterion by which a person is judged
and measured is the job that he or she does.
ICD SURVEY, supra note 9, at 47.
47. See ADA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 306.
48. See id.; see also Shelley Donald Coolidge, Fewer with Disabilitiesat Work Since Passage of Civil Rights Act, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrrOR, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1 ("It costs $200 billion a year
in public and private payments to keep disabled Americans in dependence .... ); Highlights of
Social Security Data (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/highlite.html> (stating
that 5,400,800 beneficiaries were receiving payments on the basis of disability in December 1997).
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Government programs at both the state and federal level attempt to

provide individuals with disabilities with a basic level of financial security and, more recently, civil rights protection. While this aid comes
under the umbrella of many different laws and programs, support for
individuals with disabilities comes in two general forms: disability
benefits and anti-discrimination laws.
A. The Avenue of Subsistence: Disability-RelatedBenefits
The United States does not have a single comprehensive system for
providing disability-related benefits. Instead, disability benefit and
compensation programs exist at the federal and state government levels
and in the private sector.49 The major programs under these categories,
are federal disability benefits, workers' compensation laws, and private
disability insurance plans, respectively. For each of these programs a
claimant must establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the

particular program in order to receive benefits. Particularly with respect
to claims for total, temporary, or permanent disability compensation,
claimants typically represent that they are totally disabled and unable to
perform their prior job. An administrative agency or private entity generally determines eligibility. Each program operates under different
standards, eligibility criteria, and procedures. 0 Often, these differences
relate to the policy objectives of the particular program.

One survey reports that approximately 36% of all disabled persons under age 65 "receive some
sort of income support from either insurance payments or government benefits. The rest of those
not working and not in the labor force (40%), most of whom are women, say that they receive no
benefits from either insurance company or government programs." ICD SURVEY, supra note 9, at
91.
49. In addition to tort law, these programs include the following: group short-term disability
insurance; long-term disability insurance; state workers' compensation benefits; social security
disability benefits; qualified retirement plan disability benefits; individual "permanent" disability
benefits; disability overhead insurance; disability buy-sell insurance; disability waiver of premium
benefits on life insurance; and living benefits on life insurance policies. See Rief, supra note 43, at
1155.
50. The variations among the different disability benefits programs present difficulty not
only in concisely analyzing the programs, but also in using receipt of one as grounds to preclude a
right under another statutory scheme. See Kenneth S.Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensationfor Illness and
Injury, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 75, 75 (1993) (arguing that the relationship among the many different
public and private compensation programs is incoherent and that the "cross-purposes" of the programs sometimes leaves individuals over-compensated while leaving others completely without
compensation).
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1. State Benefits-Workers' Compensation
The most traditional disability benefits programs provide for compensation to employees injured in the course of their employment." At
the state level, employees who have become temporarily or permanently
disabled as a result of a work-related injury or illness may seek compensation through the state workers' compensation programs." Typical
workers' compensation laws operate on the principle that an employee
injured on the job is automatically entitled to certain benefits without
regard to fault.5 3 These laws generally provide a system to compensate
eligible employees in a prompt and fair manner for loss of earning capacity and for medical care due to work-related injury and illness.' Recovery is usually available for work-related disabilities which are temporary or permanent in duration, and partial or total in severity.5 5 These
classifications, combined with an employee's average wages, provide
the basis for compensation computation.

5 1. See BERKOWrrz, supra note 4, at 15-40 (discussing the historical development of workers' compensation programs which guarantee some income support, but not employment, to workers injured in the course of employment); 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §§ 5.00-.30 (1997) (discussing the historical development of
worker compensation law and noting that New York was the first state to enact a workers' compensation law in 1910 and by 1920 all but eight states had adopted worker compensation statutes,
with Hawaii, the last state coming under the system, in 1963); Abraham & Liebman, supra note
50, at 79 (noting that all fifty states have adopted some form of workers' compensation programs).
52. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-902(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. LAB. CODE.
§ 3850(a)-(b) (West 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.61(2), (11) (West Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. cl. 152, § 1(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 Subd. 9, 10
(West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 287.020(1), .030(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1997); see also 2 & 3 Workers' Comp. Bus. Mgmt.
Guide (CCH) 1 21,001-72,001 (1997) (listing state workers' compensation laws). There are also
a variety of federal laws designed to provide compensation or recovery to federal employees injured in the course of employment. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1) (1994).
53. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supranote 51, § 1.10.
54. See generally 1 id. § 2.20. Larson notes that the underlying philosophy of workers'
compensation laws stems from a societal recognition of the need to provide, in a dignified, efficient, and certain form, financial and medical benefits to workers injured as a result of their employment duties. However, these compensation systems do not restore claimants to their preinjury
earning status; rather, compensation scales may not exceed the minimum necessary to keep the
injured out of destitution. See l id. §§ 2.10, .50.
55. See 4 id. § 57.12(a) (noting that workers' compensation statutes ordinarily classify disabilities into four categories: temporary partial, temporary total, permanent partial, and permanent
total). For purposes of workers' compensation statutes, a permanent disability is one that will last
"the rest of [the] claimant's life" or for an indefinite duration as distinguished from a temporary
disability from which a person usually recovers after a normal healing period. See 4 id. § 57.13.
56. In addition to varying definitions for the term disability, discussed infra, each state's
workers' compensation laws employ varying methods to determine the amount of benefits to
which a disabled worker is entitled. Total disability benefits are generally "expressed as a fraction
of an injured worker's weekly wages, subject to a maximum." Rief, supra note 43, at 1156. These
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The disability concept in the workers' compensation context is
usually framed in terms of medical impairment, actual wage loss, or a
combination of the two.5 However, the precise definitional standards
for workers' compensation recovery vary depending upon the applicable
state law and benefits program. These differences can be significant. For
example, some workers' compensation statutes define "disability" in
terms of a loss or reduction in wage earning capacity that results from a
work-related injury.-" Other statutes may define disability in terms of
impairment, as it relates to the worker's decreased efficiency and ability
to perform tasks as easily as before the injury, and not strictly in terms
of loss of earning power.'9 Under this type of statute, an injured worker
may have a compensable "disability" even if he is employed at the same
work and at the same wages as before the injury6 Disability definitions
under most workers' compensation statutes generally do not consider
the claimant's ability to work with reasonable accommodations nor do
they distinguish between marginal and essential job functions. 1
A claimant is generally considered "totally disabled" in a workers'

benefits may also include full payment of medical costs, lump-sum payments for designated injuries, and survivor's benefits. See id.; see also 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 51, § 2.50 (noting
that in addition to medical expenses, wage benefits to the employee are generally one-half to twothirds of the employee's average weekly wage).
57. See 4 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 51, § 57.11 (noting that the disability concept in
workers' compensation law is generally a blend of two ingredients-both medical condition and
inability to earn wages).
58. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3(12) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "permanent
total disability"' under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act as an "incapacity because of
accidental injury or occupational disease to earn any wages in any employment for which the employee may become physically suited and reasonably fitted by education, training or experience,
including vocational rehabilitation"); The Model Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act,
§ 2(h) (1977) defines "disability" as "a decrease of wage earning capacity due to injury." For a list
of state statutory definitions of "disablement" and "disability," see 10 LARSON & LARSON, supra
note 51, at app. A-6-1, tbl.6.
59. Disability has been interpreted differently in some statutes:
[Als used in some statutes, the word "disability" has not been restricted to mere loss of
earning power, and under such statutes the mere fact that an injured worker is employed
at the same work and at the same wages as before the injury will not disentitle him to
compensation under the act, if his physical efficiency has been substantially impaired,
or if he is unable to perform the same work with the same ease as before he was injured
82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 380 (1992) (footnote omitted).
60.

See EEOC Guidance,supra note 32, at 162.

61. See id. at 15 (stating that workers' compensation laws were intended to compensate an
individual for loss of income due to work-related disability). "Because of the emphasis on lost
earning capacity, the workers' compensation definitions of disability generally focus on what a
person can no longer do rather than what s/he capable of doing with or without reasonable accommodation." Id.
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compensation context, if his "condition is such as to disqualify him
[temporarily or permanently] for regular employment in the labor market."62 This definition recognizes that a claimant need not be entirely
helpless or totally incapacitated to be found totally disabled.63 Accordingly, evidence that a claimant has been able to "earn occasional wages
or perform certain kinds of gainful work does not necessarily rule out a
finding of total disability." 64 One may also be considered permanently or
totally disabled under workers' compensation statutes on the basis of a
listed injury, condition, or loss.65 In these situations, evidence of the
claimant's actual earnings is immaterial.6
2. Private Disability Insurance

An individual may also obtain disability benefits through a privately purchased or employer-sponsored, long-term disability insurance

plan. Receipt of benefits pursuant to such plans is a contractual, rather
than a statutory right. Private disability insurance is the least prevalent
form of private loss insurance. 67

Most private disability insurance plans insure only against losses
caused by total disability.6 The definition of what constitutes a
"disability" varies depending upon the specific contractual language.
Some policies define disability in terms of the inability of an insured to
perform the primary duties of his occupation. 69 Other policies define a
62. 4 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 51, § 57.00. "Conversely, when the claimant is unable
to obtain employment because of his physical condition, medical evidence that he could perform
such work if he could get it will not detract from his status of total disability." 4 Id. Larson notes
that "inability to get to work, traceable directly and substantially to a compensable injury, may be
as effective in establishing disability as inability to perform work." 4 Id. § 57.61(a).
63. See 4 id. § 57.51(a) (describing the "Odd Lot" doctrine, which is "accepted in virtually
every jurisdiction"). Under the Odd Lot doctrine, total disability is not to be interpreted as utter
helplessness. "Iotal disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether
incapacitated for work, are [handicapped to such an extent] that they will not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market." 4 l. § 57.51(a).
64. 4Id.
65. A prima facie case of "permanent total disability" may be presumed under some workers' compensation statutes for an employee who has, for example, lost vision in both eyes or has
lost both arms or legs. See 4 id. § 57.52. An example of one such statute is OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
85, § 3(12) (West Supp. 1997). The SSA similarly presumes some disabilities are totally disabling.
See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
66. See 4 LARsON & LARSON, supra note 51, § 57.52; see also EEOC Guidance,supra note
32, at 163.
67. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 50, at 81-82 (noting that approximately 22% of
American workers are covered by private long-term disability plans, paying approximately $6 billion annually in benefits).
68. See Rief, supranote 43, at 1176.
69. See id.
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disabled individual as one who cannot perform the duties of his job for
which he is suited by his age, education, and experience. Still other
disability insurance policies only consider an insured disabled if he cannot perform the important duties of any occupation. 7' Frequently, the
contractual definitions of disability make no allowance for an individual's ability to work with reasonable accommodation, nor do they distinguish between marginal and essential functions.
3. Federal Disability Benefits Under the Social Security Act
The federal government provides disability benefits under two programs administered by the SSA. The Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits program 7 provides benefits to disabled workers, dependents, and surviving spouses if the worker is insured under the provisions
of the disability insurance program. The Supplemental Security Income
program provides benefits to disabled individuals whose income and
assets fall below a specified level.74 Although the eligibility criteria under the two programs is different (i.e., the Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits program is based on prior work record and the Supplemental Security Income program is based on financial need), many
of the administrative requirements, procedures, and standards for assessing disability are virtually identical in both programs (collectively referred to as "social security disability benefits").7' Together, these programs pay annual benefits in the range of forty-two to fifty-three billion
dollars to eligible disabled individuals.76

70. See id.
71. Seeid. atl177.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 420-425 (1994). Whereas workers' compensation covers only work-related
disability, Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits are available regardless of whether a person's disability or injury was caused by employment. In order to receive benefits, an individual
must be insured for benefits, not have reached retirement age, have filed an application, and have a
disability. See idl § 423(a)(1)(A)-(D). The term "disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in
any substantial painful activity." Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1994).
74. See id, §§ 138la-1382d.
75. For example, both programs use the identical definition of disability. See id.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A), § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B).
76. See Report to Congress on Rising Cost of Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits,
59 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 67, 67 (1996) (reporting 5.8 million Social Security Disability Insurance
beneficiaries in October, 1995 and estimating $42.7 billion in annual costs); Spencer Rich, Returnto-Work PlanProposedfor Disabled,WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1996, at A21 (noting that the govern-

ment distributes $53 billion in support payments to over six million people through the Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income programs).
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a. Disability Defined
The federal benefits programs are designed to provide minimal financial support for people who, because of a disability, are generally
incapable of gainful employment.' As defined in the statutes, a person
is "disabled" if he is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
'
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."78

To meet this definition, an applicant must have a "physical or mental
impairment or impairments ...of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy."79
b. Evaluating Disability Claims
The SSA follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an applicant meets the statutory definition of disabled."0
First, the SSA determines whether the applicant for benefits is currently
engaged in "substantial gainful activity."'" If yes, the applicant is not
considered disabled, regardless of medical condition, age, education,
and work experience. 2
Second, the SSA determines whether the applicant has a severe
77. See FRANK S. BLOCH, FEDERAL DIsABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.3-.6 (1984)
(describing the history and purposes of disability programs created by the Social Security Act). For
a detailed discussion of the history and requirements of the social security disability benefits programs, see Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawingthe Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HAIv. L. REv. 833 (1976).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994).
79. Id. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
80. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f) (1997) (describing the general process by which claims
of disability are evaluated); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f) (1997) (same). These two regulations are
virtually identical. For ease of reference, this Author will hereinafter refer only to § 404.1520. See
also Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 584-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing the SSA's sequential disability qualification process); BLOCH, supra note 77, § 2.10
(stating that the sequential evaluation process has been accepted by the courts as a proper method
for adjudicating social security disability claims).
81. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Substantial gainful activity is a key concept in the Social Security Act's disability standard and is defined as work that "(a) Involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) Is done (or intended) for pay or profit." Id.§ 404.1510.
The same definition of substantial gainful activity can be found at id § 404.1572. Work activity is
ordinarily considered substantial and gainful if earnings exceed a certain amount listed in the
regulations. See SOCIAL SEC. ADmIm., supra note 42, at 9 (stating that an applicant whose earnings
average more than $500 a month is generally considered not disabled).
82. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
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impairment (or combination of impairments). An impairment is severe

if it "significantly limits [the applicant's] physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities."'83 If the SSA determines that the applicant's

impairment is "non-severe," he is not considered disabled for benefits
purposes and the claim is therefore denied.
If the applicant's impairment is severe, the inquiry proceeds to the
third step, which is based on the SSA's Listing of Impairments 4 If the
impairment or medical condition meets the requirements of a listed dis-

ability or its medical equivalent," the SSA presumes that the applicant
is disabled and awards benefits." If the applicant does not have a listed
disability, the claim proceeds to a fourth step where the SSA determines

whether the impairment prevents the applicant from performing his
"past relevant work."" If the applicant is able to perform past relevant
work, he will be found not to be disabled and the claim will be denied. 8
If the claimant is prevented from performing past relevant work

(and does not have a listed disability), the claim continues to a fifth step
Under this final step, the SSA evaluates whether the applicant can per-

form other work that is available "in significant numbers in the national

83. L § 404.1520(c); see also id. § 404.1521 (defining an impairment that is "not severe").
Basic work activities are "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." Id. § 404.1521(b).
"Basic work activities" include, but are not limited to, the following:
(I) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, ifting, pushing, pulling,
reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations;
and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Id.
84. Id. § 404.1520(d) ("If you have an impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement
and is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled without
considering your age, education, and work experience."). In the SSA's Listing of Impairments, 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1997), the SSA has set forth a pre-approved list of disabling impairments for each of the major body systems which it has deemed are so severe as to automatically preclude substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 1525(a).
85. See id. § 404.1526.
86. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986) ("If a claimant's condition
meet or equals the listed impairments, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled and entitled to
benefits.").
87. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Here, the SSA considers the applicant's "residual functional
capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work [the applicant] ha[s] done in the past."
Id. Residual functional capacity is defined as "what [the applicant) can still do despite [his] limitations." Id. § 404.1545(a).
88. See id § 404.1520(e).
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economy,"'

9

considering the applicant's residual functional capacity;

age, education, and past work experience. 9°
A person, who has a severe impairment, does not have a listed disability, and cannot perform past relevant work, is "disabled" unless the
which is avail-92
SSA proves that the applicant can perform other work
9

able in significant numbers in the national economy. By this process,

the SSA seeks to determine whether the claimant is unable to engage in
substantial gainful activity93 and is thereby eligible to receive total disability benefits. Despite this seemingly stringent standard, the social security disability benefits laws also contain work incentive provisions

entitling recipients to a "trial work period" during which they can test
their ability to work without losing benefits.Y

89. Id. § 404.1560(c).
90. See id. § 404.1520(f)(1).
91. See id. § 1566(a).
We consider that work exists in the national economy when it exists in significant
numbers either in the region where you live or in several other regions in the country. It
does not matter whether (1) Work exists in the immediate area in which [the applicant]
Iive[s]; (2) A specific job vacancy exits for [the applicant]; or (3) [The applicant] would
be hired if [he] applied for work.
Id.
To determine whether a claimant can perform any work which exists in the national
economy, the SSA considers what the individual still can do, given his/her functional
limitations and vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience). Individuals who have marginal education, long work experience (i.e., 35 years or more)
in only arduous unskilled physical labor, and can no longer do this kind of work may
have a disability for SSA purposes be eligible for benefits even though they are capable
of performing sedentary work.
EEOC Guidance, supra note 32, at 158-59 n.39.
92. The claims procedure for most social security disability benefits is initiated on special
forms provided by the SSA. These are usually filed with a local Social Security office which
makes the initial determination about an applicant's entitlement to benefits. A dissatisfied claimant
must request a reconsideration of the claim before receiving a hearing before an administrative law
judge. The decision of the administrative law judge becomes final unless Appeals Council review
is requested. Denials of review or decisions of the Appeals Council are the last step in the administrative review process. The applicant then has the option of instituting judicial proceedings by filing suit in a federal district court. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(1)-(5) (1997).
93. See BLOCH, supra note 77, § 2.10 (noting that this is "the ultimate statutory question").
94. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(a)-(e). This regulation permits a beneficiary to test his ability
to work, keep income earned for up to nine months, and still be considered disabled for benefits
purposes, subject to some limitations. See also SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 10
(explaining that social security disability "Benefits While You Work" incentives include a ninemonth trial work period, extended eligibility period, deductions for impairment-related expenses,
and medical continuation); SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 05-10095, WORKING WHIME DisABLED: How WE CAN HELP 2 (1997) (explaining work incentive rules for recipients and providing
information "to help you treat your disability as a 'bridge,' not the end of the road").
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c. Application Process/Disability Representations
The procedure for applying for social security disability benefits
begins with an application made either in writing or by telephone.9
Applicants generally are asked about the disabling condition that prevents them from working, when they became unable to work, and
whether they are still disabled. Applicants also must affirm that they
will notify the SSA if their medical condition changes such that they are
able to return to work.6 The application also includes the following
proviso:
I know that anyone who makes or causes to be made a false statement
or representation of material fact in an application or for use in determining a right to payment under the Social Security Act commits a
crime punishable under Federal law by fine, imprisonment or both. I
affirm that all information I have given in this document is true.Y
Applications for workers' compensation or private disability insurance
typically require similar certifications by the applicant.
Based upon these representations in disability benefits applications,
as well as disability determinations made by the SSA or other entities,
many employers defending disability discrimination lawsuits invoke the
doctrine of judicial estoppel. The defendants argue that the plaintiff, by
virtue of their representation to be unable to work for purposes of receiving disability benefits, should be estopped from claiming to be
"otherwise qualified" and therefore unable to maintain a disability discrimination lawsuit. 98

95. See SocIAL SEC. ADMN., supra note 42, at 7 ("You may file by phone, mail, or by visiting the nearest office.").
96. See Connell, supra note 17, at 10.
97. Soc. Sec. Admin. Form SSA-16-F6, reprinted in 1A Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1685-4
(1995).
98. See Connell, supra note 17, at 12 (emphasizing that a plaintiffs statement regarding
total disability on a disability benefits application is taken under the penalty of perjury). Connell
also recommends that defense counsel confront ADA plaintiffs with the consequences of their
prior representations, "that is, his or her criminal responsibility for perjury and/or welfare fraud."
Id. at27.
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B. The Avenue ofMainstream Society: Disability
Anti-DiscriminationLaws
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Through the late 1960s, federal and state governments offered disabled individuals little more than access to disability-related benefits."
Society made virtually no attempt to move disabled individuals into
mainstream society. Although people with disabilities were not included
in the civil rights laws of the 1960s, a change in public sentiment recognizing the rights of the disabled population began to emerge.'00
Congress enacted the first major federal law to recognize the civil

rights of individuals with disabilities with the Rehabilitation Act of
19730' ("Rehabilitation Act"). However, this law applies only to the
federal government, federal contractors, and those receiving federal financial assistance.'0 2 Nearly twenty years later, Congress passed the

99. One commentator noted:
Until the late 1960s, the philosophy towards Americans with disabilities was a combination of paternalism and fear-the result was usually segregation....
For the adult, the philosophy was to provide disability benefits-financial support
so the individual could exist, but with little attempt to move the individual back into
the mainstream of society.
LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DisABmY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 6 (1995); see also
SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 158-65 (describing the standard practice of institutionalizing people
with disabilities).
I00. Challenges to the notion that "being disabled mean[s] lifelong economic dependency"
occurred through the enactment of rehabilitation policies aimed at "the integration of disabled
people into the mainstream of American life" and through "landmark litigation and legislation"
which recognized individuals with disabilities for the first time as a minority group that is "subject
to discrimination and worthy of basic civil rights protection." ADA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 465-66. Two landmark cases, Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972), and PennsylvaniaAss'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), held that disabled children who had previously been excluded from public education
had the right to a public education appropriate to their educational needs. In addition to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994 & Supp. 11995), Congress enacted several
other pieces of legislation designed to promote equal opportunity and integration of disabled people into the mainstream of American life. Chronologically, these statutes are as follows: Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1994) (requiring federally funded or leased
buildings to be accessible to the disabled); Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1625 (1994) (requiring eligible jurisdictions to provide accessibility plan for mass transportation); Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994)
(providing that each handicapped child was entitled to a free appropriate education in the least
restrictive environment); and National Housing Act Amendments of 1938, 12 U.S.C. § 1716
(1994) (providing for barrier removal in federally supported housing).
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b.
102. See id. § 794.
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ADA,10 3 prohibiting all forms of discrimination against individuals on
the basis of disability.'" The ADA addresses the problem of discrimination in such critical areas as employment, public services, public accommodations, and telecommunications." Specifically with regard to
employment, the ADA prohibits employers °6 from discriminating
against qualified individuals with disabilities in hiring, compensation,
promotion, termination, and other decisions affecting employment.' °7
Congress stated four major goals when it enacted the ADA.' First,
the ADA was intended "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."'" Second, it was intended to establish "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.""0 Third, the ADA was designed "to ensure
that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards [of the ADA] on behalf of individuals with disabilities.""' Finally,
the Congress intended "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority
... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-today by people with disabilities."" 2
Through the ADA, Congress sought to do more than eradicate discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. The idea was
to allow disabled individuals to receive an equal opportunity to fully
participate in the workforce so that they would be able to live in an independent and self-sufficient manner."3 With the ADA's guarantee of
nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation, otherwise qualified
disabled individuals are expected to move away from economic dependency upon the government 4 and toward economic self-sufficiency

through working.
103. Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 &
47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1994 & Supp. 11995)).
104. See id. § 2(b).
105. See 42U.S.C §§ 12101-12189; 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611.
106. The ADA applies to most employers who have 15 or more employees. See id.

§ 12111(5).
107. See id. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").

108. See id.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

§ 12101(b).

§

12101(b)(1).
Id. § 12101(b)(2).
Id. § 12101(b)(3).
Id. § 12101(b)(4).
See id. § 12101(a)(8).
See id. § 12101(a)(9) ("[Tihe continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimiId.
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To achieve protection under the employment provisions of either
the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act,"" individuals must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination u 6 This case is met where a plaintiff establishes: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) he is qualified and able to perform essential functions of the job; and (3) the employer discriminated against or terminated the disabled individual on the

basis of his disability.'17
A person is "disabled" under the ADA when such individual has
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
'5

an impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment.
An individual is "qualified" provided he can perform, with or without
reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of the particular job
that the individual holds or is seeking."9 Discrimination includes, inter
nation and prejudice... costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.").
115. For ease of reading, references hereinafter to the "ADA" will also encompass like provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (requiring that
courts read the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as consistent with each other); see also Pritchard v.
Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Congress intended for courts to
rely on Rehabilitation Act cases when interpreting similar language in the ADA."); Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the legislative history of the ADA
indicates a Congressional intent for case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act to be equally
applicable to the term "disability" in the ADA).
116. In determining whether a prima facie case exists, courts apply the burden shifting
framework for Title VII discrimination cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). The three steps of the framework are as follows:
(1) the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination;
(2) [if the plaintiff's burden is satisfied,] the burden then shifts to the defendant, who
must offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action; and (3) if the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then come forth with evidence indicating
that the defendant's proffered reason is merely a pretext.
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 619 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997); see also White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th
Cir. 1995) (discussing burden shifting in the context of ADA claims).
117. See White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 (discussing the elements of a prima facie case under the
ADA); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (7th Cir. 1992) (construing the elements of a
prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The Rehabilitation Act uses an identical definition. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The term "essential functions" connotes the primary responsibilities involved in a particular position and does not include marginal ones. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(1) (1997). Determining whether someone is "qualified" under the ADA usually requires an individualized assessment of a number of factors, including identifying essential functions of the job in question, assessing the individual's capabilities, and determining whether the
individual will be able to perform the job with a reasonable accommodation. See Wilkinson, supra
note 46, at 912; see also White, 45 F.3d at 361 (discussing the analysis for determining whether an

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:377

l for an individual
alia, not making reasonable accommodations s"
with a
known disability or otherwise denying equal opportunities to such an
individual based upon his disabled condition.'
Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA provide substantial legal
redress for individuals who can meet this burden and prove that they
have been discriminated against because of their disability. Such indi-

viduals may obtain injunctive relief, such as reinstatement or an order to
reasonably accommodate, and may additionally recover compensatory
and punitive damages.'2

2. State Disability Discrimination Laws
Most states have enacted anti-discrimination legislation that pro-

tects individuals with disabilities."z Some of these state laws rely upon
the same analytical framework as the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.'24
However, state anti-discrimination laws are inconsistent and usually
provide limited enforcement power, leaving individuals with disabilities
little in the way of a state remedy for discrimination.'

ADA plaintiff is "qualified").
120. Reasonable accommodation may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations ....
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Some courts have held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proposing an
accommodation and showing its reasonableness. See, e.g., White, 45 F.3d at 360-61; Cline v.
Western Horseman, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Colo. 1996).
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. For defenses to the charge of discrimination, see id. § 12113.
122. 42U.S.C.§ 12117.
123. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200(a) (Michie Supp. 1996); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1463(B)(1) (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a) (Michie Supp. 1995);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 952 (West Supp. 1997); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (West Supp. 1997).
124. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1(16) (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1997); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir.
1996) (interpreting provisions in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination as analogous to the
ADA), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997); Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 9, 13
(D.D.C. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 116 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (analyzing plaintiff's claims
of violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act under the legal standards adopted pursuant to the ADA).
125. See RoTrSTrIN, supra note 99, at 6.
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C. Traveling Both Roads
Disability laws and programs have developed to recognize the
rights of disabled individuals, not only to minimum financial security,
but also to equal opportunity for employment. The laws providing for
disability benefits are designed to provide financial subsistence so that
disabled individuals can survive from day to day. The laws prohibiting
discrimination in the workplace go further. They attempt to help those
individuals with disabilities who are able to work, with reasonable accommodation if necessary, obtain employment, participate in social and
economic mainstream society, and become free of economic dependence on the government. Thus, the foundation of both forms of public
financial and legal protection is equitable in nature and seemingly consistent, if not interdependent.
Nevertheless, many courts have held that an individual may not
travel both roads-that an individual who applies for or receives disability benefits cannot later claim disability-based discrimination in
employment.' 26 Accordingly, millions of individuals with disabilities in
the United States who apply for or receive disability compensation are
potentially foreclosed from availing themselves of the civil rights protections that are accorded to them under the ADA.7
II.

THE ROADBLOCK: JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The statutory disability benefits programs and anti-discrimination
laws are the major forms of legislative protection available to individuals with disabilities. Both statutes, however, are silent as to their impact
or effect on the other. Neither provides that one or the other is an exclusive remedy. Nonetheless, individuals who have at various times
applied for or received disability benefits, are continually encountering
a formidable roadblock when pursuing legal remedies under the disability anti-discrimination statutes. A standard response to these claims by
the defendant is to move for summary judgment on the grounds that the
plaintiff, having claimed to be totally disabled or unable to work in the
disability benefits process, is precluded from asserting to be "qualified"
to work, thereby lacking a key element of an ADA prima facie claim.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a person having claimed to be totally disabled in the benefits process may

126. See infra Part III.B.1.
127. See Wilkinson, supranote 46, at 915.
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later bring an employment discrimination claim under the ADA. To
date, the federal circuits have addressed the issue differently." The nu-

merous federal district courts across the country which have also dealt
with the issue are similarly divided. The common element, however, is

that many courts analyze the issue, expressly or implicitly, through the
common law doctrine of judicial estoppel.
A. ProceduralBackground
1. The Judicial Estoppel Doctrine
The common law doctrine of judicial estoppel' 29 prevents a party

from assuming a position in a judicial proceeding that is inconsistent
with a previous statement or contention made under oath in a prior proceeding. 3 ' The doctrine's purpose is to promote the broad public policy
objectives of "(1) preserving the sanctity of the oath by requiring consistency in sworn positions; and (2) protecting judicial integrity by avoiding inconsistent results in two proceedings."'' It is intended to protect
judicial integrity by preventing litigants from playing "'fast and loose
with the courts ' 3 2 or "speak[ing] out of both sides of [their] mouth,""'

128. The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts
of Appeals have addressed similar versions of this issue. The Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits
have affirmed, without opinion, decisions applying judicial estoppel. See cases cited supra notes
21-29.
129. The judicial estoppel doctrine is distinct, with separate policy goals and elements, from
other forms of estoppel, such as collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel. Collateral estoppel, to
conserve judicial resources and prevent repetitive litigation, prevents relitigation of the same position or fact already adjudicated among the same parties. See Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of JudicialEstoppel, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1244, 1247
(1986). Equitable estoppel is intended to maintain a level playing field between the parties and
permits a litigant "to prevent his opponent from changing positions if (1) he was an adverse party
in the prior proceeding; (2) he detrimentally relied upon his opponent's prior position; and (3) he
would now be prejudiced if a court permitted his opponent to change positions." Id. at 1248. In the
cases discussed herein, courts do not always identify the judicial estoppel doctrine as the basis of
their decision but employ general principles of estoppel or preclusion. These courts implicitly apply judicial estoppel in this context, as no other legal doctrine permits a court to declare, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff is precluded from asserting a legal claim on the basis of prior inconsistent statements.
130. See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTlcs AND PROCEDURE § 4477
(1981 & Supp. 1997) (stating that the judicial estoppel doctrine is also known as the "doctrine
against the assertion of inconsistent positions"); see also Henkin, supranote 19, at 1711 (same).
131. Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Bates v.
Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the doctrine of judicial estoppel
is recognized in the second circuit)). For a discussion of the judicial integrity and sanctity of the
oath policies, see Boyers, supra note 129, at 1253.
132. Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
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and from obtaining inconsistent results by appearing before different
courts and presenting contradictory assertions. The doctrine is equitable
in nature and is applied at the discretion of the court."3
Despite these jurisprudential purposes, judicial estoppel has been
criticized,'35 and even rejected, in some circuits.'36 Even courts recognizing the doctrine vary widely in interpreting and applying judicial estoppel. Although there is no clear agreement among the courts as to the exact requirements of judicial estoppel,'37 four basic elements emerge

among the tests cited by circuits recognizing the doctrine.'38 First, the
Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council, 851 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1988)).
133. McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958
(1997).
134. See id. at 617; Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993).
135. The doctrine has been criticized as leading to unfairly harsh results and precluding the
search for truth-truth being the goal of the modem Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Henkin, supra note 19, at 1729-43 (arguing that the modem and liberal pleading rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made judicial estoppel an ancient and unnecessary doctrine).
However, pleading in the alternative, permitted by FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2), is not available in the
discrimination context since the two claims (claims for discrimination and disability benefits) must
be pursued in different fora. Cf.Eric A. Schreiber, Comment, The JudiciarySays, You Can'tHave
It Both Ways: JudicialEstoppel-A Doctrine Precluding Inconsistent Positions,30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 323, 333 (1996) (arguing that judicial estoppel does not interfere with the truth-seeking
policies behind FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2), alternative pleading, because judicial estoppel is not applied within a proceeding but only to subsequent litigations).
136. The Tenth and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals have rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel outright. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10
(10th Cir. 1991) (stating that the Tenth Circuit "does not recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel"); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the "judicial estoppel doctrine has no vitality" in the D.C. Circuit because it is "'out of harmony with [the modem
rules of pleading] and would discourage the determination of cases on the basis of the true facts as
they might be established ultimately"' (quoting Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438
(10th Cir. 1956))).
137. See, e.g., Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing judicial estoppel "as an 'obscure doctrine,' lacking 'defined principles' and subject to criticism as 'basically an
"ad hoe" decision in each case' (quoting United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir.
1993); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that the doctrine must be
"applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the
doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statemene').
138. The elements of judicial estoppel have been set forth as
(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained;
(2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent;
(4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must
have been misled and have changed his position; and (6) it must appear unjust to one
party to permit the other to change.
28 Am. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 70 (1966). The court in Ryan Operations G.P. v. SantiamMidwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996), established a two-part test which inquires into
(1) whether the present position is inconsistent with the prior position and (2) if so, whether either
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doctrine generally applies to a factual position taken under oath by a
party in a previous judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.' Second, the
prior inconsistent position must have been successfully maintained on
its facts or adopted by the court in the prior proceeding."4 Third, the
positions asserted must be completely inconsistent. 4' Finally, some circuits require an element of bad faith or proof that the party intentionally
asserted inconsistent positions, by "playing fast and loose with the
courts.' 42 Other requirements mentioned are reliance upon and prejudice as a result of previous assertions made by the opposing party.'43
Even assuming courts were to agree that the above elements consti-

tute judicial estoppel, they disagree as to its application, particularly
when addressing disability discrimination claims by a plaintiff who has
previously claimed total disability or inability to work in a disability
benefits context. In this respect, many courts have determined that a
claim for total disability benefits and a claim that one is nonetheless
"qualified" in an ADA action are inherently inconsistent. Asserting both

claims, according to those courts, is dispositive evidence that a party is
playing "fast and loose" with the judicial system-regardless of whether
all of the elements of judicial estoppel are satisfied.'"

of the assertions are made in bad faith. See id. at 361. Many other courts have relied upon various
tests that include, in some form, similar elements. See, e.g., Dockery v. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909
F. Supp. 1550, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. fI1.
1989).
139. See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that judicial estoppel does not apply to prior statements made in an "an uncontested, non-judicial, administrative proceeding"); Dockery, 909 F. Supp. at 1558 (stating that judicial estoppel does not apply
to statements made in administrative filings that are taken under oath); see also infra notes 258-67
and accompanying text (discussing the judicial proceedings aspect).
140. This is the "prior success" requirement. See infra notes 267-78 and accompanying text;
see also Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Ci. 1996) (noting
that majority rule is that judicial estoppel is inapplicable unless previously adopted by another
court); Schreiber, supra note 135, at 336 ("The current majority position ...requires that a party's
prior statement was actually accepted as true by a court or administrative agency before a later
court can invoke judicial estoppel.").
141. Inconsistency in position is the single common element required by all circuit courts
recognizing the doctrine. See DeShong v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 737 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th
Cir. 1984) (stressing that "inconsistency is the crucial element of the doctrine of (judicial] estoppel").
142. Ryan Operations,81 F.3d at 361.
143. See Henkin, supra note 19, at 1722-24, 1756.
144. See, e.g., Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 605-06; McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618-19; Johnson v. Hines
Nurseries, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F.
Supp. 547,555 (D. Kan. 1995).
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2. Summary Judgment
Defendants typically seek summary judgment to dispose of plaintiffs' ADA claims, expressly under judicial estoppel, or alternatively, by
contending that a plaintiff's representations made in connection with the
application for disability benefits means no genuine issue of fact exists
as to whether the plaintiff is "qualified."
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a court to enter
summary judgment when the entire record, consisting of the "pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." '45 The party seeking summary judgment must produce
evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or
identify those portions of the materials that will establish the absence of
a triable issue for the court or a jury to consider.' 6 Once the movant
makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant
(usually the plaintiff) who must set forth, by affidavit or otherwise,
"'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."" 47
In deciding whether a factual dispute is "genuine," a court is not to
make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence and must
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 48
A court must determine whether the nonmoving party has sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in his favor. 49
B. JudicialAnalyses of the Effect of Total Disability
Representationson ADA Claims
Courts have employed different analytical approaches in dealing
with the scope of judicial estoppel's preclusive effect to statements on
applications for disability benefits."

145. FFD. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
146. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
147. FED. R CIrv. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
148. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge .... The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.").

149. See id. at 248.
150. For a discussion of the judicial approaches to analyzing the preclusive effect of disability
representations as they relate to ADA claims, see Dush v. Appleton Electric Co., 124 F.3d 957,
962 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997); Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 516-18
n.10 (5th Cir. 1997); Buck v. Fries & Fries, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 896, 902 (S.D. Ohio 1996); and
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1. ADA Claims Barred
A significant number of federal courts have dismissed ADA claims

due to prior representations of total disability or inability to work made
in applications for state, federal, and even private insurance benefits.
These courts barred subsequent ADA claims, usually on summary

judgment grounds or related theories of preclusion. First, some courts
adopt a per se or strict judicial estoppel approach, holding that a plaintiff who has applied for or received disability benefits upon representations of total disability is automatically barred or judicially estopped as
a matter of law from presenting evidence or arguing he was qualified or
able to perform essential functions of the position for purposes of the

ADA. Four circuit courts of appeals,"5 ' as well as numerous district
courts," 2 have expressly applied judicial estoppel to bar disability dis-

crimination claims on this basis.
Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Services, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1441-42 (N.D. Cal. 1996). These
approaches are loosely categorized as "strict estoppel," "binding admissions," summary judgment
(or "qualified individual" analysis), "statement-based estoppel," or "no-estoppel." See Griffith v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (E.D. Ky. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-6361, 1998 WL
29870, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998) (addressing the "binding admissions" approach); Connell,
supra note 17, at 7-9 (discussing judicial estoppel and qualified individual approaches); Anne E.
Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: JudicialEstoppel and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1529, 1551, n.114 (1996) (stating that the summary judgment, or
"qualified individual" analysis, results in the same end as judicial estoppel); Heather Hamilton,
Comment, JudicialEstoppel, Social Security Disability Benefits and the ADA: The Circuits Diverge, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 127, 136-49 (1996) (referencing the "strict estoppel," "statement-based
estoppel," and "no-estoppel" tests used by the courts),
151. See Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Budd v.
ADT See. Sys., Inc., 103 F.3d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Rissetto v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1996); McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d
610, 617-19 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997); cf. Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp.,
943 F. Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aftd, 128 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1997).
152. See, e.g., Smith v. Lindenmeyr Paper Co., No. 95-3973, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7916, at
12-13 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1997); Erit v. Judge, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 774, 779 (D.N.J. 1997); Fredenburg v. County of Contra Costa, No. C-96-3136-VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5564, at *4-5 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 1997); Thomas v. Fort Myers Hous. Auth., 955 F. Supp. 1463, 1466 (M.D. Fla.
1997); Johnson v. Hines Nurseries, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Hindman v.
Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 224 (D.S.C. 1996), aft'd,No. 96-2784, 1997 WL 786272
(4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997); Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 943 F. Supp. 261, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y.
1996), afftd, 128 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1997); Violette v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 962 F. Supp.
446, 449 (D. Vt. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 1997); Bollenbacher v. Helena Chem. Co.,
934 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Miller v. U.S. Bancorp, 926 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Or.
1996); Terry v. Norfolk S. Ry., 948 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Harris v. Marathon Oil
Co., 948 F. Supp. 27, 29 (W.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1997); Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976, 981 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F.
Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Kan. 1995); Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (D. Kan.
1995); Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 945 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Harden v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 900 F. Supp. 493,496-97 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528,
1538 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547, 555 (D. Kan. 1995).
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Second, rather than expressly applying judicial estoppel, a number
of courts have precluded a plaintiff's subsequent ADA claim, ostensibly
employing a summary judgment standard or "qualified individual"
analysis. These courts have generally determined that because a plaintiff

previously represented total disability, no genuine issue of material fact
exists that the plaintiff is "qualified" for the position and hold that no
reasonable juror could find the plaintiff to be qualified." 3 In some instances, courts using this approach consider facts beyond the mere assertion of total disability on the disability benefits application form,'-

such as repeated representations of total disability by the plaintiff, a
physician, or attorney or continued receipt of disability benefits. 5 How153. Courts use terminology familiar to the summary judgment standard, such as that the
plaintiff either cannot (i.e., is precluded) establish an essential element of the ADA claim or that
no reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor because of prior disability representations. See
e.g., Hindman, 1997 WL 786272, at *1 (affirming summary judgment based upon "traditional
summary judgment principles" while declining to address the judicial estoppel issue); Kennedy v.
Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that it is unnecessary to apply
judicial estoppel when there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff is totally disabled);
August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that no reasonable
fact finder could conclude that plaintiff is qualified where plaintiff had declared that he was continuously and totally disabled on numerous disability applications); Hatfield v. Quantum Chem.
Corp., 920 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that plaintiff, who had previously represented himself as totally disabled, was not, as a matter of law, a "qualified individual" within the
meaning of the ADA).
154. It is proper and necessary in this context, as with any summary judgment motion, for a
court to consider all evidence in the record in addition to the statements made in the disability
benefits context. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c). As argued in Part IV, infra, this includes consideration
of other facts and circumstances surrounding the disability benefits representations and the individual's ADA claim to determine if evidence exists as to whether the plaintiff is "qualified." While
this is arguably the correct approach, a number of courts appear to use summary judgment as a
disguised or interchangeable form of judicial estoppel.
155. See August, 981 F.2d at 582-83 (considering whether there was any evidence to contradict the representations of total disability made on the disability benefits application); Ott v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., No. C 96-2158 SBA, 1997 WL 231110, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1997)
(ruling that plaintiff is not qualified under the ADA due to repeated representations of total disability made by the plaintiff and treating physicians); Buck v. Fries & Fries, Inc., 953 F. Supp.
896, 906 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that no reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff was
qualified considering plaintiff's prior representations of disability to the SSA in conjunction with
an "overwhelming" amount of evidence from the defendant that the plaintiff was not qualified);
Johnson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 943 F. Supp. 1108, 1110, 1115 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that plaintiff
is not qualified as a matter of law where he made numerous certifications of complete disability
and continued to receive benefits); Morton v. GTE N. Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169, 1181-83 (N.D. Tex.
1996) (holding that no reasonable juror could find plaintiff was qualified under the ADA where
both she and her physician continuously represented her inability to perform her job duties and
continued to receive benefits), affid, 114 F.3d 1182 (5th Cir. 1997); Harden, 900 F. Supp. at 49697 (holding that assertions by plaintiff, his physician, or attorney that plaintiff was totally disabled
when applying for long-term disability benefits, though denied, required a finding that plaintiff
cannot demonstrate he is now a qualified individual); Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F.
Supp. 963, 967-70 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (stating that no rational fact finder could find plaintiff was
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ever, few courts have either considered or given weight to other facts

and circumstances beyond the representations which might suggest the
plaintiff could be qualified (such as accommodation issues and other

factors discussed herein) and instead, found statements made in the disability benefits context so dominating as to preclude a triable issue of
fact as to whether the plaintiff is qualified.'56

Third, other courts have treated a plaintiff's prior representations
of total disability as nonrebuttable "binding admissions" of total inability to work and therefore held
that the plaintiff cannot assert to be
"qualified" in an ADA action.'5 7
Under these approaches, ADA claims have been summarily dismissed due to the plaintiffs' representations of inability to work made in
the benefits application process. It generally did not matter to the courts

that a plaintiff was working when the alleged discriminatory act occurred, that benefits had been denied, or that there was no actual determination of total disability in the benefits process. Nor did the courts

give any weight to the fact that the reason for claiming total disability

qualified where totality of the evidence demonstrates numerous certifications of inability to work
by plaintiff, her physician, and lawyer).
156. The court in Dush v. Appleton Electric Co., 124 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)), held that summary judgment is proper unless there is ."strong countervailing evidence that the employee . . . is, in fact,
qualified."' Dush mistakenly attributes this standard to Mohamed by taking the language out of
context. The court in Mohamed was using this language for the purpose of describing the analysis
of other courts as they applied judicial estoppel, not for the purpose of setting a standard as a
reading of Dush would lead a reader to conclude. Mohamed stated: "In the absence of strong
countervailing evidence that the employee or applicant is, in fact, qualified, these courts [applying
judicial estoppel] appear to have determined that the prior representations carry sufficient weight
to grant summary judgment against the plaintiff." Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 282. Dush also misstates the standard for ruling on summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, doubts
are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party need only demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact. It is not, as Dush holds, necessary to present "strong
countervailing evidence." See FE. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
157. Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (E.D. Ky. 1996), rev'd, No.
96-6361, 1998 WL 29870, at *6-7 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998) (rejecting treatment of prior statements
of inability to work as binding or "'super admissions"'); Reigel, 859 F. Supp. at 969-70; see also
Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
plaintiff who admits she is unable to perform her work presently and in the future is not protected
under the Rehabilitation Act); Erit v. Judge, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 774, 779 (D.N.J. 1997) ("Plaintiff's
post hoc attempts to qualify his assertions of complete disability are unconvincing in light of the
unequivocal language of the assertions themselves."); Bonnano v. Gannett Co., 934 F. Supp. 113,
115 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing an ADA claim where plaintiff had made "unequivocal formal
representations" of disability); Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (N.D. Ala.
1995) (holding that plaintiff is bound by his prior testimony in a workers' compensation proceeding that he could not perform essential functions of his job and therefore cannot assert he is qualified under the ADA).
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was often due to an employer's failure to accommodate or that disability
benefits were granted based upon a listed or presumptive disability under the benefits guidelines, or that the standards for total disability determinations were different from the ADA.
a. Not "Qualified" Even if Working or Total Disability Is
Presumed
In McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.,5 ' an assistant manager at a local
Disney Store was hospitalized for pneumonia and shortly thereafter was
diagnosed as HIV-positive. Upon returning to work, his district manager
called him into her office and asked him if the rumors of his IVpositive status were true. 9 Presumably fearing discriminatory treatment, the employee lied (stating he had suffered from pneumonia) and
returned to work. Ten days later, the employee was fired for taking two
dollars from the cash register. Thereafter, the employee applied for and
received state and social security disability benefits. To obtain these
benefits, the employee and his doctors certified under oath that he was
totally disabled and unable to work.
The employee later filed an action against Disney, alleging disability discrimination. Disney moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting employment discrimination after having applied for and received disability benefits
which he received based upon representations of total disability.' 60 The
plaintiff argued that Third Circuit precedent provided that judicial estoppel be narrowly applied and only when the defendant showed the
following: (1) the prior inconsistent position was made under oath in a
judicial proceeding; (2) such statement was accepted by the tribunal; (3)
both parties were litigants to the prior proceeding; and (4) prejudice
would result unless estoppel were applied. 6' These elements were arguably not met in the plaintiff's case.
The Employment Law Center and the EEOC filed amicus curiae
158. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
159. Incidentally, it is likely that this question was itself a violation of the ADA. The ADA
prohibits an employer from "makfing] inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination
or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(d)(4)(A) (1994).
160. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 615-16.
161. See id. at 617. The plaintiff relied, in part, upon Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d
510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953), in identifying these elements of judicial estoppel. The test currently used
in the Third Circuit was articulated in Ryan Operations.See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617-18 (citing
Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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briefs on the plaintiff's behalf also arguing that applying judicial estoppel to ADA claims based upon a disability benefit determination is inappropriate because the two systems "'diverge significantly in their respective legal standards and statutory intent." '62
The McNemar court disagreed on all counts, declaring that a court
may invoke judicial estoppel in its discretion when it feels a party is attempting to undermine the integrity of the judicial process.'63 First, the
court replied that "application of judicial estoppel is not limited in the
formulaic manner urged by [the plaintiff]."' The court reasoned that
the basic premise of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the
courts; therefore, it is appropriate for a court to apply judicial estoppel
when the party asserts an inconsistent position.6' McNemar noted that
"well reasoned decisions" addressing similar situations used judicial
estoppel to preclude a plaintiff's employment discrimination claim.' 66
The court applied judicial estoppel even though (1) the plaintiff had
been performing the essential functions of his job when terminated; (2)
neither the district court in the ADA case nor the SSA ever made an individualized determination of his ability to work; (3) the plaintiff's prior
statements were not made in a judicial tribunal; and (4) the defendant
was not a party in the prior benefits proceeding. 67
The pivotal factor in McNemar appeared to be that the plaintiff
himself had claimed to be totally disabled and his later assertion in the
ADA action that he was qualified was tantamount to his playing "fast
and loose" with the court. 6' Despite the argument that applying judicial
estoppel to bar the ADA claim would place the plaintiff "'in the untenable position of choosing between his right to seek disability benefits
and his right to seek redress for an alleged violation of the ADA,"' "69 the
court said that the plaintiff had to make that choice unless the legislature
stated otherwise. To the court, trying to maintain the position of having
claimed total disability while asserting to be qualified to perform the es-

162.
163.
164.
165.

McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620.
See U
Id. at 617.
See id.at 616-18.

166. Id. at 618.
167. See id.
168. See id.at 618. The opinion does not suggest that the court made an actual finding in this
case that the plaintiff acted in bad faith or "deliberately asserted inconsistent positions in order to
gain advantage," as required by Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d
355, 363 (3d Cir. 1996), cited by the court.
169. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620 (quoting Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp.
1138, 1142 (N.D. IM.1994)).
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sential functions of a job is the equivalent of making "false representations with impunity."'
b. Benefits Settlement
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 34317 held that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting claims against an employer based upon her ability
to work after she had obtained a workers' compensation settlement
based upon her assertion that she was unable to work. 72 In response to
the argument that a settlement does not meet the "prior success" element of judicial estoppel, the Rissetto court reasoned that a favorable
workers' compensation settlement amounts to a favorable judgment for
purposes of applying judicial estoppel."3 It applied judicial estoppel
even though the plaintiff's prior position was taken in a workers' compensation proceeding rather than in a court. 74 Finally, the court noted
the perceived inequity that would result from allowing a plaintiff to assert the inconsistent positions and recover twice based upon those assertions."
c. Benefits Denied
Judicial estoppel has also been used to preclude a plaintiff's ADA
claim even though benefits were denied and the plaintiff was found not
to be totally disabled. For example, in Bollenbacherv. Helena Chemical
Co.,176 a worker was injured while driving a chemical applicator truck
for his employer. The company first transferred the worker to a less demanding clerical position and then fired him.'" The worker had recovered on a workers' compensation claim prior to being fired. 78 After his
termination, he applied for long-term disability benefits pursuant to an
170. Id.

171. 94 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. See id at 606.
173. See id at 604-05; see also Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 943 F. Supp. 261, 268-69
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a favorable settlement constitutes success for purposes of applying
judicial estoppel), aff'd, 128 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1997).
174. See Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 604.
175. See id.at 606. The risk that a plaintiff may recover twice is mitigated by a set-off remedy in the ADA action where damages may be reduced by disability benefits received during the
relevant time period. See Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587

(D.C. Cir. 1997).
176. 934 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
177. See id.at 1020.
178. See id.at 1031.
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employee benefit plan. The insurer denied his application.'79 He later
filed suit against the company in federal district court, alleging wrongful
termination in violation of the ADA, wrongful denial of long-term disability benefits in violation of ERISA, and retaliatory discharge under
state law.'o
The employer argued that plaintiff should be judicially estopped
from asserting an ADA claim where he previously asserted that he was
fully disabled and entitled to long-term disability benefits. The plaintiff
argued that he had been denied long-term disability benefits and, therefore, was not asserting a position inconsistent with a successfully maintained prior position. Instead, he was simply seeking alternative forms
of relief pursuant to Rule 8(a) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8'
The Bollenbacher court granted the defendant's motion to reconsider the court's order, allowing plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint and held that the plaintiff was estopped by his earlier claim
for long-term disability benefits from asserting that he was an otherwise
qualified individual under the ADA.' The court declined to follow circuit precedent," in Overton v. Reilly,' 14 which said that an SSA determination as to benefits eligibility was not dispositive as to whether
the
recipient may be qualified under the ADA.'5 The Bollenbacher court
distinguished the Seventh Circuit precedent based upon the fact that in
Bollenbacher, the plaintiff claimed to be totally disabled, whereas in
Overton, the plaintiff merely collected trial disability benefits while
continuing to work.16 Instead, the Bollenbacher court determined that
there were cases applying judicial estoppel that were more factually
similar and therefore more persuasive."8 The court expressed its concern
"about the inequity of permitting a plaintiff to claim that he is totally
disabled in order to receive disability benefits while also permitting him
to allege that he is a 'qualified individual with a disability' in order to

179.

See id. at 1020.

180. See id. at 1025.
181. See id. at 1026.
182. See id at 1028.
183. See id. at 1026-27.
184. 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992). For a discussion of Overton, see infra notes 230-38.
185. See Overton, 977 F.2d at 1196.
186. See Bollenbacher,934 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
187. See id at 1027-28 (citing Miller v. U.S. Bancorp, 926 F. Supp. 994, 999-1000 (D. Or.
1996) (concluding that the holdings of Overton and Smith do not apply where a litigant claims
total disability and then attempts to bring an ADA claim)).
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bring an ADA claim." ' Thus, the Bollenbachercourt chose to apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to the plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination even though he brought his claims in the same proceeding
and his claim for benefits had been denied." 9
d. Failure to Accommodate
A number of courts have precluded ADA claims despite plaintiffs'
contentions that they were unable to work or sought total disability
benefits precisely because the employer denied requests to provide reasonable accommodations. For example, in Cline v. Western Horseman,
Inc., "9' the plaintiff was terminated after having applied for temporary
total workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that she was not
able to perform her duties on a full-time basis because of disability,' 9' a
factual circumstance that required the employer to consider a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.'9 Although the court posed the issue as
whether the plaintiff could perform the job with reasonable accommodation, it ruled that the plaintiff was estopped from claiming she was
qualified because she had received total disability benefits after termination based upon representations of inability to work and doctor certifications to the same effect.' 93 According to the court, this evidence
precluded a jury finding that the plaintiff was a qualified individual with
a disability for ADA purposes."" The court was impressed with the
weight of authority applying judicial estoppel in this context and did not
address whether the plaintiff could have been "qualified" had the employer provided the required accommodations.'9 5
The First Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed this issue in
August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc.'9' The plaintiff in August had taken
188. Id. at 1028.
189. Other courts have applied judicial estoppel or summary judgment despite the fact that
claims for total disability benefits were denied. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477,
1481-82 (9th Cir. 1996); Bonnano v. Gannett Co., 934 F. Supp. 113, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Smith
v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Kan. 1995); Harden v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 900 F. Supp. 493,497 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
190. 922 F. Supp. 442 (D. Colo. 1996).
191. See id. at445.
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (including modified work schedules and job restructuring as possible reasonable accommodation); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include, inter alia, "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual").
193. See Cline, 922 F. Supp. at 446,448-49.
194. See id. at 448.
195. See id. at 447-48.
196. 981 F.2d 576 (lst Cir. 1992).
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leave from his job to undergo psychiatric treatment. At a meeting several days after the end of the leave period, the plaintiff told the employer that he would likely be ready to return to work approximately
two weeks later but would need accommodation in his schedule due to
the side effects of anti-depressant medication. A day after this meeting
with his employer, the plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance, wherein he stated that he was totally disabled. The employee
failed to return to work after a second leave of absence and was terminated. Subsequently, the employee filed a claim under the state disability discrimination law (similar to the ADA).
The First Circuit concluded that based upon the disability submissions, the plaintiff was totally disabled at all relevant times and therefore could not establish that he was "qualified" and entitled to file a
claim under the state law.'98 The court focused upon the plaintiffs application for disability insurance and relied upon two Rehabilitation Act
cases, one in which the plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits
after informing her employer that due to mental and physical problems
she would be unable to work in the foreseeable future, and the other in
which the plaintiff retired as totally disabled and later sought to be rehired by the employer.' The court upheld summary judgment in favor
of the employer, concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff could have performed his job even if his
disability had been accommodated. Specifically, the court stated that
"[u]nder any definition of the term, [employee's] declaration that he
was 'totally disabled' means that he was not able to perform the essential functions of his job ... , with or without reasonable accommodations.' ' "
197. See id. at 578-80.
198. See id. at 582.
199. See id. at 582-83 (citing Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th
Cir. 1987), and Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.I. 1984)). In both of these cases, the
court found that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
200. Id. at 581. The dissent in August, however, strongly argued that summary judgment
should not have been granted because there remained a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the plaintiff could have returned to work had the employer accommodated his disability in the manner suggested by the plaintiff at his meeting with the employer. The dissent focused on statements made by the plaintiff at this meeting in which the plaintiff suggested ways he
could be accommodated. The dissent also stated that the majority relied too heavily on the plaintiff's characterization of himself as totally disabled on the disability insurance forms. The dissent
noted that such forms are "imprecise" and that it would be logical for an employee to take full advantage of a company's temporary disability benefits in the absence of a provision of an accommodation by his employer. That is, without the requested accommodations, the employee could
honestly say he was incapable of working. See id. at 586 (Pettine, J., dissenting).
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Accommodation issues remained unresolved in other cases holding
that no factual issue existed as to whether the plaintiff was "qualified"

because of representations of inability to work made in the disability
benefits process. In these cases, even if the plaintiffs had a viable claim
of discrimination, they were precluded from arguing the failure of the
employer to reasonably accommodate the disability because of statements made on disability benefits applications.2'O
Despite the pending accommodation issues, many of these courts
assume that "[tlhere is no reasonable accommodation that can be given
to allow a totally disabled person ... to perform the essential functions
of any job."2 2 These courts typically did not determine which job functions were essential, whether the plaintiff could work with reasonable
accommodation, or consider the employers' efforts (or lack thereof) to
provide accommodations. In these cases, whether an employer actually
refused to provide reasonable accommodations was never reached and
did not pose a disputed issue preventing entry of summary judgment.
2. ADA Claims Permitted
ADA claims have been permitted despite plaintiffs' receipt of disability benefits in primarily two contexts.2°3
201. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1996); Edt v. Judge, Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 774, 779 (D.N.J. 1997); Fredenburg v. County of Contra Costa, No. C-96-3136VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5564, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1997); Thomas v. Fort Myers Hous.
Auth., 955 F. Supp. 1463, 1465-66 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Buck v. Fries & Fries, Inc., 953 F. Supp.
896, 906 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Johnson v. Hines Nurseries, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Tex.
1996); Violette v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 962 F. Supp. 446,449 (D. Vt. 1996), aft'd, 116
F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 1997); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (E.D. Ky.
1996), rev'd, No. 96-6361, 1998 WL 29870 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998); Miller v. U.S. Bancorp, 926
F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Or. 1996); Terry v. Norfolk S. Ry., 948 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ga.
1996); Harden v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 493,497 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
202. Harden, 900 F. Supp. at 497.
203. In addition to the mentioned areas, some courts have declined to apply judicial estoppel
where statements of the plaintiff's total disability were made by others, such as a physician or attorney, rather than by the plaintiff directly. See, e.g., Marvello v. Chemical Bank, 923 F. Supp.
487, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying dismissal of an ADA claim and declining to apply judicial
estoppel where there was no direct evidence plaintiff swore he was totally disabled); Department
of Transp. v. Grawe, 447 N.E.2d 467,471 (111.App. Ct. 1983) ("[Jludicial estoppel is inapplicable
to statements made in the course of prior proceedings by witnesses for a party against whom the
doctrine is sought to be asserted."). Cf.Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1576
(S.D. Ga. 1995) (reserving judgment as to the application of estoppel, although the SSA declared
plaintiff 100% disabled and eligible for Supplemental Security Income, because "there is no direct
evidence in the record showing that [the plaintiff] swore [he was permanently disabled]"), aftd,
106 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 1997). By contrast, other courts hold that a plaintiff adopts his agent's
representations of total disability. See Harden, 900 F. Supp. at 496-97 (stating that where plaintiff,
his physician, or attorney maintained that he was totally disabled when applying for long-term
disability benefits (though denied), as a matter of law, cannot demonstrate he is a qualified indi-
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a. Statement-Based or "Qualified" Total Disability
Exception
Courts have recognized a narrow exception to the strict estoppel
presumption where a plaintiff qualified his statement of total disability
in some way when applying for benefits.'W For example, where a plaintiff articulates at the time of applying for benefits that he could work
had reasonable accommodation been provided, estoppel may be
avoided. However, attempts to make such a qualification after having
applied for benefits and upon filing an ADA action are not given the
same consideration.
A striking example of such a qualification is evidenced in Ward v.
Westvaco Corp2ss In Ward, the defendant sought summary judgment on
plaintiff's disability discrimination claim based upon his prior receipt of
disability benefits. The defendant argued that the facts were similar to
those in August and warranted summary judgment as a matter of law.2 6
The Ward court, however, distinguished August based upon the fact that
the plaintiff in Ward qualified his assertion of disability by saying that
he would have been able to perform his job had reasonable accommodations been provided.' The plaintiff attached a letter to his disability
insurance application, explicitly stating that "'any statements made ...
are not intended as a waiver by me of my position that I would have
been able to continue to perform my duties as an employee of Westvaco
if Westvaco had made reasonable accommodation for my disability.'","
The court concluded that "Ward's clear and deliberate qualification of
his handicap status in his application
for disability benefits took the case
'
August."
of
framework
the
outside
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of D'Aprile v. Fleet
Services Corp.,2t ° gave significant weight to the fact that a plaintiff who
suffered from multiple sclerosis made no "broad admission of incapac-

vidual with a disability).
204. At least one commentator has advocated this "statement-based estoppel" approach where
the court focuses on a plaintiff's statements made during the benefits process. See Hamilton, supra

note 150, at 155-57.
205. 859 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1994).
206. See id at 614-15.
207. See id. at 615.

208. Id.
209. Id. The court noted that disputed issues existed as to whether the plaintiff was
"qualified" because of the qualified benefit application statements and because his requests for
accommodations, although belated, were denied prior to his termination. See id. at 616.
210. 92F.3d 1(lstCir. 1996).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/4

40

Weston: The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks That Prevent
1997]

DISABILITY BENEFITS AND THEADA

417

ity" and stated she could work with reasonable accommodations.2 1 The
court held that the plaintiff could pursue her ADA claim against her
former employer for refusing her request for accommodation in the
form of a part-time schedule, notwithstanding her application for shortand long-term disability benefits after her termination. The court reasoned that at the time of the alleged unlawful action, the plaintiff was
arguably qualified for the work because she had not yet claimed that she
was totally disabled. In addition, it wasn't until after her condition
worsened due to the stress caused by her employer's refusal to 2accomdisability. 12
modate her request that she made a declaration of total
D'Aprile and Ward are among a small number of cases declining to
grant summary judgment or invoke judicial estoppel when plaintiffs
qualified their statement of total disability at the time of applying for
benefits."1 Courts are not as willing to consider qualification reasons,
however, when a plaintiff attempts to explain in a disability discrimination lawsuit why a prior "total disability" statement was not completely
Inc.,214
accurate. For example, whether the plaintiff in Erit v. Judge,
could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was not
relevant because the court ruled that the plaintiff's sworn representations of inability to work in order to obtain disability benefits precluded
such an argument. The court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to explain
those statements, finding that the "[p]laintiff s post hoc attempts to
qualify his assertions of complete disability are unconvincing in light of
2 5
the unequivocal language of the assertions themselves.""
The statement-based estoppel approach in part formed the basis of
the district court's denial of an employer's motion for summary judgment in Mohamed v. Marriott International,Inc.1 6 In Mohamed, the
plaintiff was a deaf employee who was unable to communicate without
the use of sign language. The plaintiff worked for Marriott for approxi211. Id. at4.
212. See id at 3-5. Plaintiff was a systems support analyst and took an extended leave of absence after developing multiple sclerosis. When her symptoms abated, she requested a temporary
part-time schedule before returning to full-time work. Her employer refused. She then applied for
and received disability benefits. The court found that the timing was crucial. See id. at 3-4. The
plaintiff "never claimed to have been totally disabled at the time she requested an accommodation." Id. at 4. The case was remanded to district court for further proceedings. See id. at 5.
213. For another example of a court considering the plaintiff's qualification regarding reasonable accommodations made pursuant to a claim of disability, see Anzalone v. Allstate Insurance,
No. CIV.A. 93-2248, 1995 WL 21672 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 1995).
214. 961 F. Supp. 774 (D.NJ. 1997).
215. Id. at 779 (finding that the plaintiff "cannot be simultaneously unable to work and qualified to perform the duties of his position").
216. 944 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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mately five years until October 1, 1993 when the employer accused him
of taking a customer's property. The employer conducted a hearing
where it was determined that the employee should be terminated. Ten
months later, the plaintiff applied for disability benefits and certified
that he had become unable to work beginning October 1, 1993 due to
"'[t]otal [d]eafness. ' ' 21 7 The plaintiff also stated on his application,
however, that he was actively seeking employment but had been unable
to locate employment since his termination date. The plaintiff was
218
awarded benefits on the basis of his deafness, a "listed" disability.
Based upon the employer's alleged failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation during the pre-termination investigation, the plaintiff
filed an ADA lawsuit. 9 In a thorough discussion of the judicial estoppel
doctrine and its applicability in light of the policies under the disability
benefits and anti-discrimination statutes, the district court denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that judicial estoppel would not bar the plaintiff's ADA claim.'m The court reasoned that
the plaintiff had not made the sort of "unequivocal and manifestly inconsistent representations that call into question the 'sanctity of the
oath' or the 'integrity of the judicial [system]."'' Since total deafness
qualifies under the SSA's Listing of Impairments, the SSA did not further investigate plaintiff's ability to work. m As a result, the court did
not believe that the SSA's determination was the equivalent of "a formal adjudication on the merits that [plaintiff was] not a 'qualified individual with a disability' within the meaning of the ADA."'m
Mohamed could be interpreted as falling within the narrow exception created by the statement-based estoppel approach because the
plaintiff qualified his inability to work at the time he applied for benefits. But in addition to pointing to the plaintiff's qualifying circumstances, the court articulated several explanations why judicial estoppel
might not apply at all-perhaps even as to those plaintiffs who had
made "unequivocal" statements of inability to work in the benefits

217. Id. at 279.
218. See id. Deafness is a listed disability under the SSA's Listing of Impairments. See 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, pt. A, § 2.00(3) (1997).
219. See Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 279.
220. See id. at 281-84.
221. Id. at 284 (quoting Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Cir. 1993)). The
court emphasized that Mohamed made clear to the SSA that he was actively seeking employment
but was unable to find work. See id.
222. See id.
223. Id.
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process.24 The court noted important policy reasons for avoiding strict
judicial estoppel, stating that "the different policy goals animating the
ADA and the SSDI provisions of the Social Security Act counsel

against perfunctory application of judicial estoppel to bar SSDI claimants from maintaining ADA actions." ' The court added that both statutes were intended to benefit the disabled population, one by guaranteeing equal employment opportunities, the other by granting assistance in
times of need while still encouraging a return to the workplace.2
b. Judicial Estoppel Rejected
Due in part to the policy differences and concerns mentioned in
Mohamed, other courts, led by the Seventh, and recently the D.C., Circuit Courts of Appeals, reject the notion that the receipt of disability
benefits should automatically invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel to
automatically bar an ADA claim.' Although many courts precluding
ADA claims on the basis of representations made in the disability
benefits process consider these positions taken in the different fora in-

herently suspect and irreconcilable,'

other courts have urged a closer

analysis before summarily applying judicial estoppel. Some of these

224. See id. at 282-84 ("n[t [is] inappropriate to invoke the fact-sensitive and limited doctrine
of judicial estoppel to erect aperse bar to ADA protection for individuals who have also applied
for and/or received SSDI benefits.").
225. Id. at 284.
226. See id
227. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 1997); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d
1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (E.D. Ky.
1996), rev'd, No. 96-6361, 1998 WL 29870 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998). The EEOC also takes the
position that representations made in the disability benefits context should not pose an automatic
bar to ADA claims. See EEOC Guidance,supra note 32, at 182-85. The Fifth Circuit has also recognized that "[i]t is at least theoretically conceivable that under some limited and highly unusual
set of circumstances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually exclusive." Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the court declined to
adopt a strict estoppel rule, instead holding that "the application for or the receipt of social security
disability benefits creates a rebuttablepresumption that the claimant or recipient of such benefits
is judicially estopped from asserting that he is a 'qualified individual with a disability.' Id. at 518.
228. See Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., 948 F. Supp. 27, 29 (W.D. Tex. 1996) ("To allow
[plaintiff] to assert that he was able to perform the duties of his employment with [defendant] at
the same time he collected disability benefits ... would countenance a fraud, either on this court
or on the federal agency that awarded him those benefits."), affd, 108 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1997).
However courts have categorized the doctrine or approach, many courts interpret these two positions as evidence that plaintiffs are playing "fast and loose with the courts," or "speak[ing] out of
both sides of [their] mouth." McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994)), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 958 (1997).
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courts have declined to apply judicial estoppel because the traditional
elements are not present. Conversely, other courts have declined to apply judicial estoppel or bar ADA claims on summary judgment, despite
prior representations of total disability, upon examining the different
statutory definitions and policy goals of the ADA and disability benefits
programs, as well as other facts and circumstances in individual cases
which indicate a plaintiff could be qualified under the ADA. In determining whether a factual issue is presented regarding plaintiff's qualification for a particular position, these courts treat statements made in the
disability benefits context as a factor, but also consider other evidence,
such as whether accommodations were denied, whether the plaintiff was
working at the time of termination, whether an actual total disability
determination was made, and whether other evidence exists indicating
that the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the particular
job.m
The seminal case rejecting a per se dismissal of a disability discrimination claim based on prior receipt of disability benefits is Overton
v. Reilly.2" In Overton, the SSA determined that the plaintiff suffered
from severe emotional illness and qualified for disability-related benefits. Concurrent with the SSA's determination, the individual was hired
as a chemist by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") through
a disability hiring program. Although the plaintiff was employed, the
SSA awarded disability benefits on a trial basis. Less than one year
later, the plaintiff was fired after an unfavorable evaluation due either to
his inability to communicate effectively with the public or sleeping on
the job. He then notified the SSA and had his benefits continued.2 1' In a
subsequent disability discrimination action, the plaintiff contended that
the EPA failed to accommodate his disability which affected his ability
to communicate and at times caused sleepiness due to the side effects of
his medication. 32
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's disability discrimination
claim on estoppel grounds because of the plaintiff's receipt of SSA disability benefits. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.73 The court
first looked at the essential functions of the position, noting a genuine
question existed as to whether communication with the public was an
essential function of plaintiff's job. The court then considered evidence
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See, e.g., cases cited infra note 250 and accompanying text.
977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1191-92.
See id. at 1195.
See id at 1196.
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that the plaintiff could perform even the communication function with
reasonable accommodation and also noted that if sleepiness is a function (or treatment) of his disability, the evidence showed Overton still
got his work done. While the EPA presented some evidence suggesting
Overton was not performing up to standards, the court held that the
plaintiff had supplied adequate evidence of his ability to perform the essential functions of his job to establish a genuine issue of fact as to
whether he is "otherwise qualified."' m
With respect to the SSA's determination that the plaintiff was disabled (or, by definition, unable to perform any "substantial gainful activity")," the court noted that the evidence presented showed that he
adequately performed most of his work. The court further stated that a
disability determination by the SSA may be consistent with a claim that
a disabled person is qualified to do his job. 6 For example, the SSA may
award benefits on a finding that the claimant's disability was among a
pre-approved list of impairments, without inquiring into the plaintiffs
ability to work.27 The court also noted that the SSA's inquiry into the
ability to work in the national economy is not exhaustive and does not
mean there is a complete absence of work for which the claimant is
suitable. The Overton court concluded that the SSA's determination of
disability may be relevant with regard to determining the severity of an
individual's disability, but it should not form the basis for a judgment
that a plaintiff is not otherwise qualified under the Rehabilitation Act.25
While Overton never expressly addressed the issue of judicial estoppel, courts in subsequent cases have attributed to Overton the rejection of judicial estoppel in employment discrimination suits. 3 9 In Smith
v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc.,2' for example, the court explicitly followed the reasoning of Overton when it refused to dismiss an individual's ADA claim against his former employer on judicial estoppel
grounds although the individual had received social security disability
benefits.24'

234. See id at 1195.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994).
236. See id. at 1196.
237. The plaintiff in Overton was granted benefits on that basis. See id
238. See id
239. See Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 109-10 (6th Cir. 1997); Mohamed
v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage,
1994); Kupferschmidt v. Runyon, 827 F. Supp. 570, 574
Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (N.D. Ill.
(E.D. Wis. 1993).
240. 859 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. ll. 1994).
241. See id at 1141.
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In Smith, the plaintiff was fired shortly after his HIV infection rip-

ened into full-blown AIDS. After his termination, the plaintiff applied
for, but was denied, disability benefits under the employer's disability
plan. He then applied for and received social security disability benefits
on the basis that his AIDS condition caused him to cease working the
day before he was terminated. The plaintiff claimed that he recovered
sufficiently from his disability and was already employed elsewhere
when he filed suit against his former employer under the ADA, alleging
that the defendant fired him and denied him benefits because of his
AIDS related illnesses. The defendant moved for summary judgment,
arguing that regardless of whether Smith actually could perform the job,
he was estopped from proving he was otherwise qualified for employ-

ment due to his representations in connection with his application for
federal disability benefits.42

The Smith court held that judicial estoppel did not apply to the
plaintiff's claim. 43 Initially, the court noted that the requisite elements

of judicial estoppel were not met!" Next, the court cited Overton and
agreed with its reasoning that "the SSA's decision to award benefits is
not synonymous with a determination that plaintiff is not a 'qualified
individual' under the ADA. Nor does it amount to a determination that
the plaintiff can not find work in the economy." 5 Finally, the Smith
court expressed reservations about the inequitable nature of applying
judicial estoppel in a case involving alleged discrimination. The court

stated that the application of judicial estoppel "would place plaintiff in
the untenable position of choosing between his right to seek disability

benefits and his right to seek redress for an alleged violation of the
ADA."" Such an inequity would conflict with the stated purposes of the
ADA.247

242. See id. at 1139-40. Smith had found another job and was receiving benefits at the time of
trial as part of the SSA's nine-month trial work period. See id. at 1140.
243. See id at 1141.
244. See id. ("[A] genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the position taken by
plaintiff before the SSA is inconsistent with the position taken by plaintiff in this lawsuit .
.
245. Id.
246. l at 1142.
247. See id. Courts applying judicial estoppel have factually distinguished Overton based
upon the fact that the plaintiff in that case never asserted that he was totally disabled and that he
had continued working on a trial basis while receiving benefits which only became permanent after he was terminated. Similarly, Smith has been distinguished based upon the fact that Smith offered reasonable explanations (i.e., changes in his medical condition) for his seemingly inconsistent positions. See Baker v. Asarco, Inc., No. CIV-94-1045-PHX-ROS, 1995 WL 795663, at *5
(D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 1995) (distinguishing Smith), affd, 121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997); Bollenbacher
v. Helena Chem. Co., 934 F. Supp. 1015, 1026-27 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (distinguishing Overton and

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/4

46

Weston: The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks That Prevent
DISABILITY BENEFITSAND THE ADA

19971

The D.C. Circuit also disagreed with the use of judicial estoppel in
the ADA context. In two opinions, the D.C. Circuit forcefully held that

ADA claims should not be barred based upon prior receipt of total disability benefits, particularly where the potential reason for a plaintiff's
seeking disability benefits is the employer's failure to accommodate.24
The court emphasized the different statutory standards and purposes of
the ADA and disability benefits programs and stated that forcing disabled individuals to choose between the programs "would undermine
the pro-employment and anti-discrimination purposes of the two statutes."'49 Other courts have also agreed with Overton and its progeny,
stating that representations for disability benefits purposes are not dispositive on the issue of whether, under federal disability discrimination

laws, a plaintiff is qualified, such as when other evidence indicates that
the plaintiff may have been able to work with or without reasonable accommodations."0
IV.

AT THE CROSSROADS-WHY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
"NEED NOT APPLY"

The foregoing analysis of relevant case law illustrates the varied

decisions courts across the country are reaching in cases involving employment discrimination claims by individuals who previously filed for
disability benefits. Courts employing the judicial estoppel doctrine, exSmith).
248. See Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, Inc., 116 F.3d 588, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
249. Swanks, 116F.3dat586.
250. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997); Blanton v. Inco Alloys
Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 109-10 (6th Cir. 1997); D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st
Cir. 1996); Sumner v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1567, 1575 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Shirley
v. Westgate Fabrics, Inc., No. 3:95-CV-2550-D, 1997 WI. 135605, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17,
1997); Roy v. Runyon, 954 F. Supp. 368, 377-78 (D. Me. 1997); Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food
Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1447-48 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F.
Supp. 277, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Hughes v. Reinsurance Group of Am., 957 F. Supp. 1097,
1100-01 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Pressman v. Brigham Med. Group Found., Inc., 919 F. Supp. 516, 52223 (D. Mass. 1996); Morton v. GTE N. Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169, 1181-80 (N.D.Tex. 1996), aff'd,
114 F.3d 1132 (5th Cir. 1997); Anzalone v. Allstate Ins., No. CIV.A. 93-2248, 1995 WL 21672
(E.D. La. Jan. 19, 1995); Kupferschmidt v. Runyon, 827 F. Supp. 570, 574 (E.D. Wis. 1993); cf.
Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that judicial estoppel does not apply to statements made in the disability benefits context, but granting summary
judgment for the defendant because the record demonstrated that plaintiff was totally disabled and
accommodations were impossible); Dockery v. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909 F. Supp. 1550, 155859 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (same); LaBonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 678 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Mass. 1997)
(holding that estoppel does not apply in a state disability discrimination claim where plaintiff who
previously received disability benefits presented evidence that he could have performed his job
with reasonable accommodations).
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pressly or often implicitly under the related qualified individual analysis, essentially hold that a claim for disability benefits, based upon representations of inability to work, and a claim that one is "qualified" under the ADA constitute an irreconcilable contradiction. The "statementbased estoppel" approach recognizes an exception where a claimant
qualifies or explains his inability to work in the disability benefits application. Yet, this still precludes individuals with similar extenuating
circumstances who did not understand the importance or opportunity to
provide such detail in the standard form for benefit applicationsY' The
no-estoppel approach holds that representations made in the benefits
process should not per se preclude ADA claims-but is this too lenient?
Determining the proper approach for analyzing and deciding
whether to preclude employment discrimination claims by plaintiffs
who previously sought disability benefits based upon representations of
their inability to work requires analysis of three primary considerations.
First, the doctrine of judicial estoppel itself needs further examination.
Second, the critical issue under any of the approaches is whether the
plaintiffs in these cases are truly and knowingly asserting inconsistent
positions. This second inquiry requires a closer examination of the
statutory definitions of disability as well as of factual circumstances
which may at least create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA,
even in light of representations made in the disability benefits process.
Finally, the practical as well as policy implications of these approaches
must be considered in determining which course is most appropriate.
A. JudicialEstoppel Reconsidered
The judicial estoppel doctrine itself requires more critical scrutiny,
particularly as it is regularly being used to prevent people with disabilities from pursuing a trial on the merits for their discrimination claim. 2 '
As demonstrated by the foregoing description of the doctrine and its
251. See Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 930F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Ky. 1996), rev'd, No. 966361, 1998 WL 29870, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998) (observing that benefits application forms
provide limited opportunities to accurately and fully explain the details of the applicant's medical
condition and ability or inability to work for ADA purposes).
252. For cases barring ADA claims because of plaintiffs' prior representations of total disability made in the benefits process, see supra notes 150-202 and accompanying text. See also
Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Indicates Readiness to Overturn Criticized McNemar, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 1, 1997, at 1 (quoting plaintiff's attorney in McNemar, Alan B. Epstein, as
stating that many cases were not filed in the Third Circuit because under McNemar precedent,
"'you had to tell [clients] that they probably had no chance of winning if they were getting longterm disability, worker's compensation or Social Security"').
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varied application, the doctrine itself is arguably in flux and its application unpredictable.253
Under this common law doctrine, a party who has maintained a
factual position in one judicial proceeding is estopped from asserting a
totally inconsistent position in another judicial proceeding. Its basic
purpose is to protect' the "integrity of the judicial system" and the
"sanctity of the oath." Courts invoking the doctrine intend to prevent a
litigant from playing "fast and loose" with the courts by "speaking out
of both sides of his mouth" and to prevent a litigant from obtaining inconsistent results by asserting contradictory propositions before different courts. However, the doctrine is construed differently among the circuits and even rejected outright in two circuit courts of appeals. 5
Even assuming arguendo that judicial estoppel were appropriate in
in many cases, judicial estoppel is misapplied. This miscontext,
this
application can have harsh consequences for litigants who are unaware
of the consequences of their statements. Moreover, the doctrine's objectives are not necessarily achieved by barring ADA claims, and in any
event, can be monitored by other, less drastic measures.
An obvious problem is that courts apply the doctrine even if the
formal doctrinal elements are not present. Instead, courts applying judicial estoppel appear to selectively choose from the traditional conditions
warranting judicial estoppel.25 6 Some circuits have reduced the doctrine
to a test which only inquires into whether the statements are apparently
inconsistent and made in bad faith. 57 Often the test rests on a court's
sixth sense that a plaintiff is playing "fast and loose," the price-a total
dismissal of a plaintiff's ADA claim.
For example, the "judicial proceeding" requirement (and namesake

253. See discussion supra Part III.A.
254. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
255. Criticisms waged against the use of the doctrine in these cases relate not only to courts'
dilution of the doctrine's definitional elements, but also because it leads to harsh results without an
examination of the underlying truth of the statements and perhaps is even unnecessary under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide mechanisms for penalizing claims brought in bad
faith or without factual support under Rule 11. See supra notes 135-37. The District of Columbia
and Tenth Circuits reject the doctrine. See supra note 136. The Second Circuit applies it only
when a party changes their position after prevailing in a prior judicial proceeding where the court
adopted the inconsistent statement. See Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037-38 (2d
Cir. 1993).
256. Cf.McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that courts
have discretion in the application of judicial estoppel and that the application of judicial estoppel
is not limited in any formulaic manner, i.e., no set of elements must be set forth before the doctrine
is applied), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
257. See supra note 138 (citing test from Third Circuit).
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of the doctrine) is often not met in these cases. Applications for disability benefits are made on paper, either to an administrative agency, such

as the SSA, state workers' compensation authority, or a private insurance carrier often in a nonadversarial setting. These applications are
generally preprinted check-box forms that do not request detailed ex-

planations of extenuating circumstances relevant to the particular applicant (such as an employer's refusal to accommodate).2

Claimants file

these applications, often without consulting counsel, sometimes at the
request of the employer, and even over the telephone.2 9 Benefit deter-

minations often do not involve a formal hearing, presentation of evidence, or adversarial adjudication.m°
These differences in a typical judicial proceeding and an adminis-

trative proceeding for the determination of benefits eligibility are relevant. As noted by the court in Mohamed, "[t]he streamlined procedures

giving rise to the SSA's determination of disability should, at a minimum, give pause to a court considering barring the courtroom door to a
plaintiff alleging employment discrimination."' The equitable basis in

258. See August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1992) (Pettine, J., dissenting) (stating that disability forms are imprecise); Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948
F. Supp. 1418, 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("vhere an employee is merely responding to questions on
disability applications, often only checking boxes or filling in blanks which have little room, the
employee may not have a fair opportunity to accurately explain the details of the employee's
medical condition and ability or inability to work.").
[S]tatements made in the SSA application and forms are open to interpretation. In determining precisely what the plaintiff "admitted" in the application, one must consider
the context in which the statements were made. Portions of the SSA application and
other forms require the applicant merely to check off boxes without comment, or require the applicant to fill in blanks with little room given for elaboration. In short, the
employee may not have a fair opportunity to accurately explain the details of the employee's medical condition and his ability or inability to work for purposes of the ADA.
Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 96-6361, 1998 WL 29870, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998).
259. See supra note 95.
260. See Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
supranote 91 (describing SSA review procedures).
261. Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 284. Even if the Tenth Circuit recognized judicial estoppel, it
would not apply the doctrine to the facts of a case where the plaintiff completed his SSA application "over the phone, outside the judicial machinery, without the benefit of counsel, and arguably
under a great deal of emotional stress. In addition.... Defendants forced [Plaintiff] into the unenviable position of being unemployed, in the advanced stages of AIDS, and emotionally devastated
by their discriminatory conduct." EEOC v. MTS Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (D.N.M. 1996);
see also Norris, 948 F. Supp. at 1447 (declining to apply judicial estoppel in part because plaintiff's statements of disability were made on written applications to a private insurer or were preprinted responses on disability forms rather than through oral testimony and language selected by
the plaintiff); Dockery v. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909 F. Supp. 1550, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
("Judicial estoppel ... should not be applied to oaths undertaken in administrative filings, as in
these ADA cases.").
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applying judicial estoppel based upon statements in written applications
is also questionable where an employee is "merely responding to questions on disability applications, often only checking boxes or filling in

blanks which have little room, [and] the employee may not have a fair
opportunity to accurately explain the details of the employee's medical

condition and ability or inability to work."

2

Despite the different nature of administrative and judicial proceedings, few courts have refused to apply the doctrine solely because the
prior proceeding was administrative rather than judicial.! 3 The Ninth
Circuit, in Rissetto, broadly endorsed judicial estoppel, ruling that the
doctrine was not rendered inapplicable "by the fact that plaintiff's prior
position was taken in a workers' compensation proceeding rather than in
a court."2' The use of statements made in an administrative setting was
justified on the ground that "'[tihe truth is no less important to an ad-

ministrative body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity than it is to a court
of law.' ' 2 65 Holding the plaintiff to his prior statement of oath seems to
be the linchpin for courts that bind a plaintiff to prior statements, even if
made on a form to a private insurance company. 266

262. Norris, 948 F. Supp. at 1447; see also United States ex rel. Am. Bank v. C.I.T. Constr.
Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that judicial estoppel is applied only when an individual has taken inconsistent positions before two courts, thereby posing a "threat to the judicial
process" by making it likely that one court has been misled); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690
F.2d 595, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the plaintiff's prior inconsistent statement on a
benefits application did not bar subsequent judicial action where the prior statement was not made
before a "judicial body"); Dockery, 909 F. Supp. at 1558 (stating that judicial estoppel does not
apply to statements made under oath in administrative filings).
263. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing cases); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617-19 (3d Cir. 1996) (ruling
that judicial estoppel can apply to statements made before an administrative agency), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 958 (1997); Johnson v. Hines Nurseries, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Tex. 1996)
(same); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547, 555 (D. Kan. 1995) (same).
264. Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 604. During the discussion of this point, the Ninth Circuit, in a footnote, cited with apparent approval a number of cases where courts "have estopped litigants who
had claimed to be totally disabled in applying for disability benefits from claiming to be
'qualified' under the Americans with Disabilities Act." ladat 604 n.4.
265. Id. at 604 (quoting Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ill.
1989)
(quoting Department of Transp. v. Coe, 445 N.E.2d 506, 508 (I1. App. Ct. 1983))); see also Simon
v. Safelite Glass Corp., 943 F. Supp. 261, 266-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that "legal proceeding" encompasses any proceeding in which a sworn position is taken), afftd, 128 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
1997); Simo v. Home Health & Hospice Care, 906 F. Supp. 714, 718 (D.N.H. 1995)
("Administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, such as those conducted by the SSA, are considered prior legal proceedings under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.").
266. Some courts interpret the doctrine to apply as long as the court is convinced that a plaintiff is threatening the integrity of the courts or the judicial process as a result of inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1167, 1170-71 & n.6 (E.D. Ky.
1996) (adopting the view that allowing a plaintiff to assert such inherently inconsistent positions
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Applying judicial estoppel in this context, however, which results
in denying plaintiffs a forum for disability discrimination claims on the
basis of prior representations (usually made on a form), stretches and
distorts the doctrine. Fundamental differences exist between the processes and procedures used in pursuing a disability benefits claim in an
administrative setting and a formal lawsuit alleging discrimination. The

doctrine's requirement of a "judicial" or at a minimum, a "quasijudicial" proceeding is sound. s6 The process involved in a judicial proceeding determining one's qualifications under the ADA implies that a
person is given an informed, full, and fair opportunity to explain his
position or statement, and that specific and individualized findings were

made in a formal adversarial litigation. By contrast, the standards, procedures, and circumstances under which an individual applies for and
receives disability benefits vary according to the particular public or
private program.m Certainly, an individual's signature or response on a

benefits application form does not carry the same procedural safeguards. Penalties for perjury or bad faith are available without impeding
the truth-seeking function of the judicial process. 6 Accordingly, the

judicial requirement should not be taken lightly."0
Courts are also inconsistent with respect to the "prior success" re-

quirement. Many circuits hold that judicial estoppel does not apply unless the inconsistent statements were actually adopted by the court-that
the plaintiff was successful27 Other courts hold that success in the prior
would work a fraud either on the judicial system or the agency that awarded the disability benefits
in the first place), rev'd, No. 96-6361, 1998 WL 29870 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998); Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., 948 F. Supp. 27, 29 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (overturning a jury verdict for plaintiff on the
grounds that allowing the ADA claim "would countenance a fraud, either on this court or on the
federal agency that awarded him those benefits"), aff'd, 108 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1997).
267. See Dockery v. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909 F. Supp. 1550, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (noting
the necessity of a prior judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding); MuelIner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp.
351, 357 (N.D. 11. 1989) (same); Mark J. Plumer, Note, JudicialEstoppel: The Refurbishing of a
JudicialShield, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 409, 411 n.1 (1987) (arguing that the policy objectives
underlying judicial estoppel necessitate that it is applied only when statements giving rise to the
inconsistency are made in a court of law (citing Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598
(6th Cir. 1982)).
268. See supranotes 258-62 and accompanying text.
269. See Henkin, supra note 19, at 1745 (asserting that the modem rules of evidence and attorney/litigant sanctions provide far better methods of protecting the interests that judical estoppel
seek to protect, while promoting the deeper policies behind the modem system of pleading).
270. See id. at 1744 (asserting that the integrity of the system would still be protected by allowing a party to come forward with evidence seemingly contrary to previous assertions and that
"[s]uch evidence could include proof of a lack of full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the previous action, perhaps due to burden of proof or discovery differences, fraud, honest mistake, inadvertence, changed facts, or unavailability of facts at the time of the prior assertion").
271. See In re BCD Corp., 119 F.3d 852, 858 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although the Tenth
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proceedings is not required if the plaintiff's change in position is intended to play "fast and loose" with the court. 272 Under the strict estoppel approach, the mere filing for benefits is sufficient for the application
of judicial estoppel.273 In these instances, court have applied preclusion
whether the plaintiff's prior claim for benefits was denied or agreed to
by settlement and thus even when an individual was said to have not
been disabled.274 Even an award of benefits, however, does not necessarily mean that the administering entity "accepted as true" the claim-

ant's inability to work representations because an award may be based
upon other criteria not requiring a specific finding that the claimant is
unable to work (such as a presumed disability or the availability of accommodations).
The "prior success" requirement (like the "judicial proceeding"
element) provides a safeguard against overreaching and against an actual risk of inconsistent results. 275 The discretionary aspect of whether to
276
apply the doctrine should enter only once these elements are present.
Circuit rejects the judicial estoppel doctrine, "judicial estoppel would only apply if the party
adopting the inconsistent positions had actually succeeded in the earlier litigation"); Lowery v.
Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Lowery v. Redd, 117 S. Ct. 954
(1997); Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Cir. 1993); United States ex rel Am.
Bank v. C.I.T. Constr. Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1991); Astor Chauffeured Limousine
Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990); Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598.
272. See, e.g., Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601 n.3 (disagreeing that prior success is required and citing Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996), as
holding "emphatically that success in the prior proceeding is not required"); Morris v. California,
966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1991); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208,
212 (Ist Cir. 1987) (holding the doctrine applies even when litigant was unsuccessful if by change
of position he is playing "'fast and loose"' with the court).
273. See Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 606; McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617-19 (3d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
274. See cases cited supra note 189. But see Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) ("A settlement neither requires nor implies any judicial endorsement of either party's
claims or theories, and thus a settlement does not provide the prior success necessary for judicial
estoppel.").
275. See Boyers, supra note 129, at 1255 (criticizing courts for applying judicial estoppel
solely without requiring the prior success element, noting that "[w]hen balancing what the judicial
system gains-integrity-with what it loses-forfeitureby the parties of theirlegal rights,judicial
abdication of the truthseekingfunction-it is questionable whether the equities support such a
broad form of judicial estoppel" (emphasis added)); Schreiber, supra note 135, at 354 (asserting
that the claimed statement should actually have been litigated and clearly adopted as true by the
earlier court before the later court should apply judicial estoppel).
276. Factors that judges should consider in balancing the policies behind judicial estoppel
include:
the importance of the right that would be lost if judicial estoppel were invoked; the
significance of the position in the prior litigation, reliance, fairness, bad faith; actual
damages suffered by the court, the litigant, and the opposing party; the fear of double
recovery or unjust enrichment; and overall considerations of justice.
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Courts which interpret judicial estoppel to apply when it is believed that
the plaintiff is acting in bad faith or "fast and loose," do so because of a
perceived threat to the integrity of the judicial system." 7 However,

making such a factual determination on the basis of representations on
disability benefits applications is premature, particularly at the summary

judgment stage.

8 This

assessment inherently requires a factual finding

of intentional self-contradiction or bad faith.
Precluding a plaintiff's ADA claim on the basis of his application
for disability benefits is tantamount to holding that the plaintiff waives
rights under the ADA by pursuing disability benefits. Waiver requires

an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 7 9 It is unreasonable to
expect that a layperson who may be desperate to obtain income from

disability benefits understands that by filing a disability benefits claim
he is waiving and releasing rights to assert an ADA claim later. Indeed,
applicants are not informed in this process that their rights to assert
claims for disability discrimination are thereby relinquished."0 The apparent inconsistencies may be unintentional or reconciled upon gather-

ing additional factual information. Summary dismissal is a harsh result
unless the litigant intentionally has taken an inconsistent position."'
Generally, the employer in these cases is not unfairly prejudiced by
a plaintiff's prior application for benefits. Plaintiffs in these cases usu-

ally apply for benefits after having been terminated, denied accommodation, or upon the request of the employer. In these situations, judicial
estoppel is a great benefit for the employer since the merits of the case

Schreiber, supra note 135, at 355.
277. See, e.g., McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617.
278. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)
("[Alt the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.").
279. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that whether such a relinquishment or abandonment of a known right has occurred depends "in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the [plaintiff]").
280. In its publication providing information on how to apply for social security disability
benefits, the SSA also informs readers of the ADA and advises them to consider their rights under
that statute. JOsEPH L. MATrHEws & DOROTHY MArHLEVs BERMA, SOCIAL SECURITY,
MEDICARE AND PENSIONS 3/3 (6th ed. 1996).
281. The court in Norris v. Allied-Sysco FoodServices, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418 (N.D. Cal.
1996), recognized the realities faced by some ADA plaintiffs when it said:
The reality of this case may be closer to that of a plaintiff driven by financial pressures
to both seek disability benefits and inquire about [reasonable accommodations], rather
than that of a plaintiff who intentionally sought to play "fast and loose with the courts"
or undermine "the integrity of the judicial process."
Id. at 1448.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/4

54

Weston: The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks That Prevent
19971

DISABILITY BENEFITS AND THE ADA

are never reached. The EEOC has asserted that this result, allowing an
employer to use benefits information to challenge whether the plaintiff
was "qualified," is analogous to the "after-acquired evidence" practice
restricted by the United 2States Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville
BannerPublishing Co.
In McKennon, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
evidence of a plaintiff's wrongdoing, or "unclean hands," discovered
after termination barred an otherwise viable employment discrimination
suit."3 The Court looked to the important public policy purposes of the
anti-discrimination statutes2 4 and held that barring the suit in such circumstances "would undermine the [statutory] objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motivations, and of penalizing
them for employment decisions that spring from [unlawful] discrimination." 5 The Court stressed that "[tihe private litigant who seeks redress
for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives of the [anti-discrimination statute]" and that the broader
"objectives of the [anti-discrimination statutes] are furthered when even
a single employee establishes that an employer has discriminated
against him or her."' 6 Under McKennon, employer liability for unlawful
discriminatory conduct is determined solely by information available to
the employer "'at the time of the decision."' ' Therefore, benefits information acquired after termination should not bar employment discrimination claims but may better serve as a means to limit damages.2"
The Third Circuit in McNemar was unpersuaded by this argument,
however, holding that "after-acquired evidence" is an affirmative defense that is utilized by the defendant and does not become an issue
until the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.2
The policy considerations set forth in McKennon do, however, seem to

282. 513 U.S. 352 (1995). The EEOC also asserted this argument in an amicus curiae brief
filed in McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620-21.
283. McKennon involved a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. I 1995), but the Court based its analysis on the "wider
statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide." McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357.
284. See id. at 357-58.
285. Id. at 362.
286. Id. at 358.
287. Id. at 360 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989)).
288. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 621 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 958 (1997).
289. See id at 620 (rejecting the EEOC's assertion that plaintiff's representation of total disability on a benefits applications should not be considered in determining whether the plaintiff is
"qualified" and stating that the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case and that "afteracquired evidence" could be used by the defendant to limit damages).
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apply equally to "after-acquired evidence" of inability to work representations made in the benefits context. In McNemar, the employer avoided
a trial on the question of whether it discriminated against McNemar on
the basis of his AIDS disability only because the plaintiff filed for disability benefits after his alleged unlawful termination. Under this practice, unlawful discrimination goes unredressed and perhaps is even encouraged.2'
Finally, the integrity of the judicial process is not necessarily compromised by allowing plaintiffs who have previously asserted disability
to proceed with their ADA claims. The judicial estoppel doctrine is
rooted in the notion that the doctrine should only be invoked when al-

lowing a party to maintain inconsistent positions would sanction an injustice. 2 1 "[The doctrine] is not meant to be a technical defense for litigants seeking to derail potentially meritorious claims ...."'Likewise,

employers should not be permitted to use judicial estoppel as a sword
against plaintiffs who may very well have valid ADA claims simply because such plaintiffs sought and received disability benefits to sustain
themselves financially, especially during periods of unemployment
which may be due to discrimination on the basis of their disability.
B. Are the PositionsReally Inconsistent?
A critical question in determining the propriety of precluding employment discrimination claims in these cases, under the judicial estoppel approach or otherwise, hinges upon whether such plaintiffs are in
fact asserting inconsistent positions. 23 On the surface, these two claims
290. For example, rather than comply with an employee's request for a reasonable accommodation, an employer could give the employee the ultimatum of taking medical leave and applying
for disability benefits or face termination. In a later disability discrimination action, the employer
would argue the plaintiff's claim of inability to work made in the benefits process precludes an
ADA claim. If accepted, the employer is able to escape liability by setting up or forcing the employee to apply for disability benefits. In Fredenburg v. County of Contra Costa, No. C-96-3136VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5564 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1997), the court acknowledged that the
employer may have violated the ADA in requiring the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination
but held that the plaintiff was not qualified under the ADA based on her prior representations of
disability and therefore not covered by it. See id. at *3-8; see also Johnson v. Hines Nurseries,
Inc., 950 F. Supp. 175, 177-78 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (applying judicial estoppel despite plaintiff's
claims that he was forced to apply for benefits because of defendant's refusal to accommodate);
Miller v. U.S. Bancorp., 926 F. Supp. 994, 996, 1000 (D. Or. 1996) (applying judicial estoppel
although plaintiff applied for disability benefits at the employer's insistence).
291. See Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir.
1996).
292. Id.
293. See DeShong v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 737 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1984)
("Ilnconsistency is the crucial element of the doctrine of [judicial] estoppel.").
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appear plainly irreconcilable. If a person is "totally disabled" and unable
to work so as to qualify for disability benefits, it appears logically impossible that the person is nonetheless capable of "perform[ing] the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires."' Proponents of judicial estoppel would argue that the ADA,
in providing rights to disabled individuals who can work with or without accommodation, simply does not cover disabled individuals who
cannot work at all, a requisite for most disability programs. Although it
may seem unfair to discriminate or bar a claim of an employee who is
no longer able to do his job, so the argument goes, that sort of discrimination is simply not within the protection of the ADA.2 s
This reasoning is superficially appealing. However, whether a
conflict exists between a plaintiff's claim of "total disability" for social
security disability benefits purposes and "qualified individual with a
disability" in an ADA action requires a closer examination of the definitions and meanings of those terms in their relative statutory frameworks.296
1. Statutory Definitional Differences
the definitional standards and the determiAs discussed in Part II,
statutory and private disability benefits
the
under
nation procedures
programs are varied and distinct from those under the federal disability
discrimination laws. While sometimes subtle, these differences are significant and may explain why there may be situations in which a claim
for disability benefits and disability discrimination may not be inconsistent.29 In summary, the following reasons are advanced as to why there
may be situations in which a claim for disability benefits and disability
discrimination may not be inconsistent: (1) the disability benefits programs and the ADA contain distinct definitional standards of
"disability"; (2) the Social Security Act considers some "presumptive"
or "listed" disabilities without regard to the individual's actual ability to

294. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining "qualified individual with a disability").
295. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610,618 (3d Cir 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 958 (1997); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987).
296. Because the definitional standards under state workers' compensation laws and private
disability benefits programs vary, only a comparison of statutory definitions under the ADA and
SSA standards for awarding benefits is made herein.
297. Several courts, including the Seventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well
as the EEOC and SSA, have maintained that these fundamental differences may explain why
plaintiffs in ADA cases are not necessarily asserting "inconsistent" positions. See cases cited supra
notes 230-40; see also McNemar, 94 F.3d at 620 (noting the arguments made by the EEOC and
Employment Law Ceaiter in opposition to the application of judicial estoppel in this context).
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work; (3) the Social Security Act requires only a generalized inquiry

into ability to work as opposed to the ADA's individual assessment requirement; (4) the Social Security Act implicitly recognizes that recipients of its disability benefits can work and encourages this activity
through work-incentive programs; and (5) significant factual circumstances in individual cases may create disputed factual issues warranting
a determination by the fact finder as to whether the plaintiff is
"otherwise qualified." 298

Significant differences exist between the disability determinations
in the benefits context and under the ADA. For example, for purposes of
the Social Security Act, "disability" is defined in part as the "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity." The individual's condition
must be one that is "expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months." o Under the ADA, an individual with a disability is a person
who has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record

of such an impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impair-

ment." ' A "qualified person with a disability" is one "who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."'3 O
The determination of eligibility for disability benefits purposes and
whether a person is "qualified" in a disability discrimination claim involves two very different analyses. Even the SSA's seemingly strict

five-step inquiry"' is a generalized inquiry into an applicant's ability to
find work and can result in a finding of total disability even though the

applicant can return to his old job or find new work.3 mFor example, the
298. These reasons are set forth by the EEOC as well as noted by various courts. See generally EEOC Guidance,supra note 32, at 18-33; see also Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the receipt of social security disability
benefits does not preclude ADA relief "[b]ecause the Social Security Act and the ADA employ
quite different standards and objectives"); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992)
(finding that an SSA award based on a listed disability and generalized inquiry into whether the
claimant can work in the national economy does not mean that the plaintiff is not able to assert
that he is qualified); Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting significant differences between the ADA and SSA standards and procedures).
299. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994).
300. Id.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
302. Id. § 12111(8).
303. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
304. See Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the SSA contemplates a "generalized" inquiry into the individual's "ability to find work in the national economy").
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SSA provides benefits to those whose impairments are the same as or
equivalent to those on the SSA's list of presumed disabling impairments, without regard to the applicants' age, education, or past work
experience."' By contrast, the ADA requires an individualized inquiry
into the ability of the individual to meet the requirements of a particular
position °6 The ADA does not permit presumptions that an individual
with a disability cannot be "qualified" to work; in fact, the purpose of
the law is to eradicate such presumptions." In addition, "in determining
whether a person meets the SSA definition of disability, the SSA looks
at the customary requirements of jobs as usually performed in the national economy without focusing on the essential functions of a particular position."33
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two statutory
disability schemes is the notable absence from the SSA's definition of
any consideration of whether the person could work with reasonable accommodation. An employee with a disability could be qualified to work
under the ADA if given a reasonable accommodation. Under the Social
Security Act, a person is entitled to disability benefits only if his impairments are "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
[in significant numbers] in the national economy."''O
Meanwhile, the ADA's requirement that an employer make
"reasonable accommodations," requires that an employer consider options, such as modifying existing job functions to create a job suitable
for a particular employee with a disability.1 Since the frequency with
which such suitable jobs may exist in the national economy could be
relatively low, a person with a disability, who would be able to perform
the essential functions of such a job with reasonable accommodations,
would still be disabled and therefore able to receive benefits under the

305. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Overton, 977 F.2d at 1196 ("[Ithe
SSA may award disability benefits on a finding that the claimant meets the criteria for a listed disability, without inquiring into his ability to find work within the economy.").
306. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287
(1987) (noting that an "individualized inquiry" into whether a person is "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act is essential to the "goal of protecting handicapped individuals from
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear").
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
308. EEOC Guidance, supra note 32, at 160.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
310. See42U.S.C.§ 12111(9).
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Social Security Act. 1 Therefore, an individual may be eligible for social security disability benefits due to the small number of jobs that exist in the national economy which are designed to accommodate his
particular needs, but due to the fact that a particular job could be restructured to accommodate such needs, the individual is still within the
312
class of people Congress intended to protect when it enacted the ADA.
The SSA also recognizes that the ADA's definition of "qualified
individual with a disability" is not synonymous with "disability" under
the Social Security Act 3" The SSA has acknowledged that whether a
claimant may be able to work with accommodations is not relevant to
its disability determination. ' Accordingly, a person who meets the Social Security Act's statutory definition of "disability" is not necessarily
totally unable to work. In fact, through work incentive programs, recipients of disability benefits are encouraged to attempt to get back into the
workforce and can receive benefits for a trial period while making the
transition into employment. 5
2. Significant Factual Circumstances May Create Disputed
Factual Issues
In addition to the definitional and analytical differences between
disability benefits standards and the ADA, relevant factual circumstances in individual cases may create disputed factual issues warranting
a determination by the fact finder of whether the plaintiff is "otherwise
qualified." These factors include outstanding issues of reasonable accommodation, timing questions as to when the plaintiff sought disability
benefits or sought to return to work, the possibility of an improvement
in condition, and whether the plaintiff was working at the time of the

311. See Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277,283 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
312. See id.; see also Memorandum from the Associate Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990-Information, reprinted in 15 Soc. SFCtJrry F. 8, 9 (1993) [hereinafter ADA Memorandum] (noting that the ADA and Social Security
Act have different purposes and bear no direct relationship to each other and stating that the SSA's
deiermination whether there are available jobs that the claimant can do is based on broad vocational patterns and not on whether a particular employer is willing to make accommodations for a
given individual).
313. EEOC Guidance,supra note 32, at 161 n.44 (referencing the ADA Memorandum, supra
note 312).
314. See id.
at 160-61.
315. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(a) (1997); see also Charles G. Scott, DisabledSSI Recipients
Who Work, 55 Soc. SEcURITY BULL. 26, 36 (1992) ("Enabling beneficiaries with disabilities to
achieve a better and more independent lifestyle by helping them take advantage of employment
opportunities is one of SSA's highest priorities.").
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alleged discrimination and applied only after termination or deterioration of condition.
In its Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC instructs its investigators
to examine the following issues "[w]hen deciding what, if any, weight
to give to [a claimant's] representations made while pursuing disability
benefits": 1 6 (1) "the definitions of terms such as 'disability,' 'permanent
disability,' 'total disability,' 'inability to work,' etc. under the relevant
statute" or insurance policy (i.e., whether these terms involve an inquiry
into that applicant's ability to perform the essential functions of a particular job as opposed to general kinds of work, or a presumption of disabled status based upon a listed condition, or take into account reasonable accommodation); (2) "the specific content of the representations
[(in particular, whether they were qualified)], who made them, and the
purpose for which they were made"; (3) "whether the representations
are in [the claimant's] own words"; (4) "when the representations were
made, the period of time to which they refer, and whether [the claimant's] physical or mental condition has changed since the representations were made"; (5) "whether [the claimant] was working during the
period of time referred to as a period of total disability"; (6) "whether
the employer suggested that [the claimant] apply for benefits"; (7)
"whether [the claimant] asked for and was denied a reasonable accommodation"; (8) "when the employer learned of the representations"; and
(9) "other relevant factors, such as advances in technology or changes in
the employer's operations that may have occurred since representations
were made that may make it possible for [the claimant] to perform the
essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodation. 31 7
Any of these factors may explain a perceived inconsistency, or at a
minimum, pose a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a plaintiff,
even having applied for or received disability benefits, can be
"qualified" to assert an ADA claim as to the particular position at issue.
A number of courts have denied summary judgment in the employer's
favor when one or more of these circumstances are present, reasoning
in the
that contradictions between representations of total disability 318
benefits process and trial evidence are matters for the trier of fact.
316. EEOC Guidance,supra note 32, at 186.
317. Id. at 186-87.
318. See, e.g., Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996); Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l,
Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pressman v. Brigham Med. Group Found., Inc., 919
F. Supp. 516, 523 (D. Mass. 1996); Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138,
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C. Practicaland Policy Considerations
A final and important consideration in determining the propriety of
precluding ADA claims involves examining the practical and policy
implications of such practice.
1. The Untenable Choice
First, the practical impact of barring claims by applicants or recipients of total disability benefits is simply to eliminate their recourse to
pursue statutory rights against disability discrimination under the
ADA.319 Under this course, disabled individuals confront the "untenable
position""2 of whether to pursue relatively immediate disability benefits
needed for financial sustenance or to wait and "gambl[e] on the uncertainty of an ADA lawsuit." 32' Which road many will take given this
choice is not difficult to deduce.
2. Disability Policy Goals Undermined
Whether this "untenable" result is warranted must be weighed
against a comparison of the public policy goals of both statutes. The
ADA seeks to eradicate
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice [that] denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our
free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions
of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity. 3z2
It is expected that the ADA will provide the opportunity for individuals
with disabilities, rather than continually receiving government disability
benefits, to become financially self-sufficient through working.3 2 Although a unique purpose of social security disability benefits is to keep
disabled individuals from becoming indigent, the Social Security Act
1141 (N.D. 11.1994).
319. It is estimated that there are approximately forty-three million Americans with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). Approximately 500,000 of them are social security disability benefits recipients who are properly and legally working while receiving benefits. See
Scott, supra note 315, at 30 & tbl.5.
320. Dovenmuehle, 859 F. Supp. at 1142.
321. Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1448 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
322. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
323. See id. § 12101(a)(8). The ADA was passed with the assumption that many individuals
on the disability rolls can, with assistance, obtain employment. See ADA LEGIsLATivE HISTORY,
supra note 8, at 107, 305.
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and the ADA share the common goal of promoting work activity among
disabled individuals, as evidenced by the work-incentive provisions
which permit a beneficiary to receive benefits while working." Allowing disabled individuals to avail themselves of the rights and protection
of both programs, as a transition or as a safety net when unlawfully discriminated against, seems consistent with policy goals of both programs. No policy objectives would be advanced by precluding disabled
individuals from asserting their rights to a discrimination-free employment based upon prior application or receipt of disability benefits.5
3. Unlawful Discrimination Goes Unredressed
Another troubling risk in dismissing ADA claims in these scenarios is that the merits of the underlying discrimination claim are never
reached and possible unlawful discrimination goes unredressed. The
ADA was passed due to a concern that individuals who are discriminated against "on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse
to redress such discrimination." 6 Private lawsuits play a critical role in
the enforcement of the ADA. Precluding disability discrimination
claims, regardless of the merits of the underlying claim, simply because
of statements made on disability benefit applications, permits an employer to escape liability even if it unlawfully discriminated or denied a
reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified employee and thus
undermines the enforcement objectives of the ADA. 27
4. The Future
The differences in definitional standards are not the only reason
judicial estoppel may be inappropriate in these cases. It is possible that
benefits programs, including those created by the Social Security Act,
may amend their statutory definitions of "disability" to incorporate issues of reasonable accommodations and individualized inquiries and
thus more closely align with the ADA's definitions.3 2 Arguably this

324. See Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277,284 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
325. See id. at 284 ("[E]stopping [plaintiff] ... would undermine the legislative policy of
providing the disabled with both protection against destitution and a genuine opportunity to participate fully in the job market.").
326. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
327. See, e.g., Fredenburg v. County of Contra Costa, No. C-96-3136-VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5564, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1997) (acknowledging that the defendant arguably violated
the ADA by imposing upon the plaintiff a broad medical examination, yet this discrimination went
excused since the court ruled the plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting she was qualified
after having sought state disability benefits).
328. See Problems in the Social Security Disability Programs: The Disabling of America?:
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creates a more problematic situation. If the definitions under the benefits programs and the ADA are essentially identical, preclusion seems
more warranted. But does it? Would this make the "untenable" choice
inevitable? This more difficult question must be assessed in view of the
practical differences and the policy objectives of the ADA and benefits
programs.
Even with these proposed changes, the objectives of the ADA
would seem to be seriously undermined. Granted, an individual who can
perform his job, but instead seeks disability benefits and then turns
around and sues the employer claiming disability discrimination
("double dipping"), 329 deserves little sympathy. Presumably, the fact
finder will agree. But it cannot be assumed that all who pursue both forums act nefariously. An employee terminated or discriminated against
because of disability may have difficulty finding new or comparable
work and in the interim will likely need to choose the relatively immediate disability benefits, rather than gamble on an ADA lawsuit. Here
the due process procedural protections underlying the "judicial proceeding" requirement, including a provision for notice to recipients of potential foreclosure of ADA claims, are extremely relevant.
Perhaps Congress needs to evaluate disability policies comprehensively. If the disability definitions are matched, then the SSA, as part of
its disability determination process, should work with the employer to
determine whether or not reasonable accommodations can be provided.
However, the agency obviously does not have the resources to make
detailed, individualized assessments in every case."O
It may be easier for private disability plans and state worker compensation programs to incorporate the ADA disability and qualified individual definitions. These programs typically work more closely with
the employer and can better identify the issues interfering with an em-

Hearing Before the Special Committee on Aging of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 84
(1995) (statement of Gerben DeJong, Ph.D., Director, National Rehabilitation Hospital Research
Center). According to Dr. DeJong, the policy assumptions underlying the disability benefits programs assume that recipients can never work, and such assumptions are both out of date and inconsistent with the ADA. Dr. DeJong recommends that the SSA modify the statutory definition of
disability to include "the availability of worksite accommodations and environmental adaptations
as a consideration in determining eligibility for income benefits." Id. at 84-85.
329. McNemar v. Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996) (characterizing dual claims
as "'double recovery"'), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
330. "Mhe average [SSA] claim tak[es] one and a half years to process. The tremendous
backlog has also, arguably, compromised the integrity and accuracy of disability determinations.
There are no face-to-face interviews during these first steps of the determination process." Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 926 (footnote omitted).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/4

64

Weston: The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks That Prevent
1997]

DISABILITY BENEFITS AND THE ADA

" ' If accommodation issues are explored at this
ployee's ability to work.33
stage, perhaps the employee can get back to work and avoid litigation.
But the problem resurfaces if accommodations are wrongfully denied.
The employee would be considered "totally disabled" under the benefits
plan, but the need for recourse under the ADA is even more urgent. Under such circumstances, is the employee precluded from claiming he is
"qualified" to state that claim? Again, unless the procedural protections
at the benefits stage are sufficient to ensure the claimant was totally unable to perform the essential functions of the particular job, a per se bar
to a subsequent ADA claim is inappropriate.

D. Using DisabilityBenefits as a Bridge Rather than a
Fork in the Road-A Proposal
1. How Disability Representations Should Be Treated in ADA
Cases
The foregoing discussion attempts to illustrate why representations

made in the disability benefits process should not pose an automatic bar
to a plaintiff's ADA claim. However, a plaintiff's representations of in-

ability to work or receipt of disability benefits should not be ignored
entirely.1 2 Courts declining to apply judicial estoppel, as well as the
EEOC, recognize that such statements, although not dispositive, may be
33

relevant to a proper disposition of a disability discrimination claim.

331. Alternative dispute resolution is also encouraged under the ADA, but no formal mechanism is in place for individuals to pursue this possibly effective option. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
332. The court in Dockery v. North Shore Medical Center, 909 F. Supp. 1550 (S.D. Fla.
1995), stated:
The receipt of disability benefits in no way provides an unfair advantage to a plaintiff
in an ADA case. To the contrary, such an admission can only hinder any attempt by a
plaintiff to later claim that she was not totally disabled.
...The receipt of disability benefits is one more piece of evidence that a Court should
take into account when determining whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff can survive a
motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 1559.
333. See Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("At best, the
Social Security determination [is] evidence for the trial court to consider in making its own independent determination."); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he determination of disability may be relevant evidence of the severity of [plaintiff's disability], but it can
hardly be construed as a judgment that [he] could not do his job ....); Norris v. Allied-Sysco
Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1448 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("[A] defendant can be given. .. a
full opportunity to use a plaintiffs words or representations against the plaintiff at trial as evidence
undermining the persuasive force of her claims in litigation."); Hughes v. Reinsurance Group of
Am., 957 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("The fact that she applied for disability benefits is
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These statements may be used at trial on cross-examination, as an evi-

dentiary admission, or for impeachment purposes if viewed as inconsistent with specific assertions made by the plaintiff in the ADA litigation.3m Information relating to receipt of disability compensation may
also be admitted at the relief stage when assessing damages in an ADA
action.
The central issue in these cases is whether there exists a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified." That is, is
there sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to get to the jury on the question of whether he could perform the essential functions of his job with

or with out reasonable accommodation? In this respect, evidence that
the plaintiff represented to be totally disabled, applied for, or received
various disability benefits may be relevant to disprove that the plaintiff
is "qualified" or not "disabled" under the ADA. In addition, the court

merely evidence to be used in determining the outcome of [the qualified person] issue."); Morton
v. GTE N. Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169, 1181-82 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (considering representations made
in the disability benefits context as a factor, but not a dispositive one, in deciding whether to grant
a summary judgment motion), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1132 (5th Cir. 1997); EEOC Guidance, supra note
32, at 179-81.
334. For example, in Daffron v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 874 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. Ct. App,
1994), the plaintiff applied for and received disability benefits. See id. at 483. After commencing
his disability employment discrimination lawsuit, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit alleging that,
despite the fact that he received disability benefits, "he was capable of performing his job duties,
and was in fact performing those duties up until the date he was laid off." Id. at 487. The plaintiff
was apparently advised by his physician to apply for full disability benefits because of his various
medical limitations which would have made it difficult for him to obtain a new job. The court refused to grant summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff's representations in the disability process were not determinative as to the issue of whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual. Rather,
the court found that such representations are "evidentiary admission[s] subject to explanation or
impeachment by other evidence at trial." Id. The court noted that inconsistencies in the plaintiff's
current and prior assertions are matters properly dealt with by the fact finder and are not proper
grounds for summary judgment. See id. at 488.
When application of estoppel is inappropriate, the party's prior inconsistent position
still may be used as evidence to impeach the party and attack his credibility. In this
way, the judicial system is protected from the general damage resulting from inconsistent positions without resort to the extreme measure of judicial estoppel.
Boyers, supra note 129, at 1255 (footnote omitted).
335. See Swanks v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("Set-offs [based on previously awarded disability benefits] may provide a way to prevent windfall
recoveries while guaranteeing disabled persons the full protection of both Acts."); Overton v,
Reilly, No. 90 C 412, 1993 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 20890, at *27 (N.D. Ell.
Aug. 13, 1993) (ordering, in
the damages phase of trial, that the plaintiff's front pay award shall be offset by the amount of social security disability compensation the plaintiff will receive); cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1995) (ruling that the amount of a plaintiff's back pay can be
limited by the discovery of "after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing" where the employer can
prove that it would have terminated the employee had it been aware of the wrongdoing at the time
of discharge).
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should consider the entire evidentiary record. Where the record also
contains evidence that the plaintiff could have performed the essential
functions of his job with or without a reasonable accommodation, a fact
question is presented and summary judgment based upon the prior
benefits representations is improper.
2. A Proposed Approach
Rather than treating evidence of a plaintiff's disability representations as dispositive, courts in these cases should apply summary judgment standards but make an individualized assessment of whether an
individual is qualified." 6 Evidence should be admissible on the question
of whether the plaintiff establishes a prima facie ADA claim, but in determining whether the plaintiff is asserting inconsistent positions or otherwise acting in bad faith, a closer individualized examination is warranted.
Specifically, each court should make a detailed inquiry into the
pertinent definitional standards and procedural measures applied in the
disability benefits context. Second, the court should determine the specific context and circumstances under which the statements were made.
In this respect, the court should consider the various factors proposed by
the EEOC which may present a disputed issue of fact.337 Additionally,
the essential functions of the position in question should also be determined and considered with evidence of the plaintiff's capabilities to
perform the particular job with or without reasonable accommodation.
Finally, in recognition of the principles underlying the judicial estoppel
doctrine, any specific evidence of fraud, bad faith, or intent to mislead
(such as a history of work-avoidance, feigned injuries, etc.) should be
examined and balanced accordingly. As in any ADA case, the court
should make an individualized fact determination of whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a disability," considering evidence of
the plaintiff's alleged capabilities. Apparent contradictions between the
plaintiff's proffered evidence and information obtained during the
benefits process are matters best left for the trier of fact and not proper
grounds for summary judgment.

336. For a discussion of summary judgment standards, see supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
337. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 32, at 178-82; supra note 306 and accompanying text
(noting that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry).
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CONCLUSION: TRAVELING BOTH ROADS

The interplay between ADA claims and disability benefits is more
complex than the judicial estoppel doctrine allows. Because of fundamental differences between disability benefits programs and the ADA, it
is not necessarily inconsistent for a person to say he cannot work when
applying for disability benefits, but that he could perform a particular
job if provided a reasonable accommodation when filing an ADA claim.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to expect a layperson who may be in desperate need to receive income from disability benefits to appreciate that
by filing a disability benefits claim he is simultaneously waiving rights
to assert an ADA claim in the future. Denying these individuals an opportunity to pursue their civil rights, by virtue of having pursued concomitant rights to disability benefits, is an unnecessarily harsh penalty.
Disabled individuals have made slow but steady progress into
mainstream society. Through the political process, individuals with disabilities gained minimal guarantees of subsistence-level financial support. They also fought through societal stereotypes to attain basic civil
rights, including the right to live and work in mainstream society. It
would be unfair for the judiciary to take away what disabled individuals
have achieved through the political process and rights Congress has
specifically bestowed upon them. Forcing plaintiffs to choose, expressly
or implicitly, by judicial estoppel, between rights to minimum financial
security and vindication of rights against disability discrimination imposes a judicial roadblock that should be removed.
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